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Abstract. Constructed from years of archival and legal research, and in-depth interviews, 
this Article unearths the story of Native Hawaiians who, tired of failed promises and hollow 
apologies, in 1978 capitalized on an indigenous cultural and political revival to change the 
law and secure reparative action. The Native Hawaiian community subsequently faced 
immediate backlash from politicians who weaponized sterile and racialized views of 
Hawai‘i’s indigenous people to create a memory of the past that upended those reparative 
initiatives. This Article is thus a legal history that, unlike any other, captures the messiness of 
politics and race relations in twentieth century Hawai‘i. It contributes to the study of 
collective memory and demonstrates the constant negotiation of history, mobilization, and 
power that lawmakers wield to either advance or stymie justice for Native Hawaiians. The 
events recounted in this Article offer both hope and a cautionary tale for those seeking 
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Hawai‘i, despite the popular view that it is a progressive haven of racial harmony, has a rich 
yet devastating legal history. This history is epitomized by the American overthrow of the Kingdom 
of Hawai‘i in 1893 and subsequent annexation of the islands in 1898 against the express will of a vast 
majority of Kānaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians),1 Hawai‘i’s indigenous people.2 For decades, scholars 
have argued that those in power often twist narratives of Hawai‘i’s legal history to justify their legal or 
political decisions.3 As Professor Haunani-Kay Trask aptly observed, the version often told of 
Hawai‘i’s history is “nothing more than a series of political myths created by foreigners and designed 
to disparage our people.”4 Due to these myths, for well over a century Native Hawaiians have coped 
with the harsh effects of colonization, and endured the pains of losing their government, the 
suppression of their culture and language, and the arduous—often frustrating—journey toward 
justice.5 
Yet, in 1978, something truly unprecedented happened. Delegates of the State of Hawai‘i’s 
1978 constitutional convention proposed and the people of Hawai‘i ratified a constitutional 
amendment creating the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (“OHA”), an agency tasked solely with bettering 
the conditions of Native Hawaiians.6 This simple act represented a significant step toward repairing 
the historical wounds of Kānaka Maoli by providing a means to begin the process of reconciliation 
and reparations. The victory, however, was short-lived. Lawmakers over the next two years narrowed 
 
 1   “Maoli” is defined as native, indigenous, aborigine, genuine. MARY KAWENA PUKUI & SAMUEL H. ELBERT, 
HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 240 (rev. ed. 1986). “Kanaka maoli” is defined as a Hawaiian native. Id. “Kanaka” is the singular; 
“kānaka” is the plural. Id. at 127. In this Article, the terms “Kānaka Maoli,” “Hawaiian,” and “Native Hawaiian” (plural) are 
used interchangeably. Unlike how residents in California are described as Californians, “Hawaiian” has always been understood 
to refer to Hawai‘i’s indigenous people. See J. KĒHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY xii (2008). 
 2   See Troy J.H. Andrade, American Overthrow, 22 HAW. BAR J. 4 (April 2018) [hereinafter American Overthrow] (describing 
the American government’s support of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, the American government’s 
subsequent annexation, and the Native Hawaiian resistance to these injustices). 
 3   See, e.g., Susan K. Serrano, Collective Memory and the Persistence of Injustice: From Hawai‘i’s Plantations to Congress—Puerto 
Ricans’ Claims to Membership in the Polity, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 353, 359–60 (2011) (discussing the impact of collective 
memory on court decisions and how Hawaiian sugar cane plantation owners furthered a collective memory of racialization of 
Puerto Ricans); Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1771–
72 (2000) (discussing the impact of collective memory on judicial decisions). 
 4   HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI‘I 129 
(University of Hawai‘i Press rev. ed. 1999). 
 5   See NATIVE HAWAIIANS STUDY COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CULTURE, NEEDS AND CONCERNS OF NATIVE 
HAWAIIANS 28 (1983) (“[T]he Commission concludes that, as an ethical or moral matter, Congress should not provide for 
native Hawaiians to receive compensation either for loss of land or of sovereignty.”). 
 6   While not perfect and not true decolonization, the creation of OHA represented a significant step on behalf of a 
colonizing government to repair historical wrongs with indigenous people. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Tales of Color and Colonialism: 
Racial Realism and Settler Colonial Theory, 10 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1, 100 (2014) (“True decolonization entails the ability of the 
formerly colonized to exercise their right to self-determination and, thus, is a process that must be envisioned and implemented 
from the ground up. Colonial powers may withdraw, or negotiate alternate arrangements with the formerly colonized, but if 
they presume to dictate the terms of decolonization, the end result is simply a different variant of colonial domination.”). 
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the constitutional mandate and made it difficult for OHA to live up to its reparatory potential. 7 
How, despite decades of suppression and deception to enshrine “political myths” 8 of 
Hawai‘i’s past that outright eliminated native resistance to the illegal changes to their land and 
government, did this reparative act and subsequent retrenchment happen? What can be gleaned about 
the impact of past events, particularly as they relate to a group’s memory, on the design and 
implementation of a constitutional or statutory provision? More broadly, how do those in power 
strategically “remember” and “forget” narratives to justify their political ends? 
This Article interrogates the battle over collective memory—the knowledge about the past 
that is shared, mutually acknowledged, and reinforced9—that ensued between 1978 and 1980 with the 
creation of OHA. The success in altering the status quo for Native Hawaiians in 1978 rested on the 
shoulders of those constitutional convention delegates who reframed the sanitized master narrative of 
Hawai‘i’s past and crafted a new collective memory highlighting the injustices to Hawaiians. As 
Professor Susan Serrano emphasizes, “[w]ho tells the definitive history of group injustice—and how 
that history is framed—is vital to shaping a group’s narrative and public image.”10 More importantly, 
this reframed history determines “the power of justice claims or opposition to them.”11 The question 
of how to achieve reparatory justice for Kānaka Maoli is, therefore, really a threshold battle over the 
collective memory of America’s settler colonial conquest in Hawai‘i. By linking collective memory 
with policy-making and legislation, this Article contributes to the well-developed, multidisciplinary 
body of research on the study of collective memory. The story of OHA’s creation offers an important 
case study to examine the strategic and selective reliance on collective memory in legal contexts. This 
Article shows how the framing of past events in connection with constitution-building and 
lawmaking could either support or undermine the legal bases for reparative action for Kānaka Maoli 
by perpetuating narratives that carried competing (in)justice claims. 
Part I of this Article theorizes the relationship between history, law, and collective memory. 
Part II then demonstrates how the colonizer’s master narrative of Hawai‘i frames a first collective 
memory whose strategic purpose is to justify American control and power over the land, the 
government, and the people. Part III recounts a history of collective struggle throughout the 1970s 
and early 1980s to challenge that master narrative in pursuit of reparative justice for Kānaka Maoli. 
Section III.A foregrounds this investigation by describing how the shifting cultural and political 
landscape in 1970s Hawai‘i unsettled the foundations of the master narrative by providing the 
requisite “terrain of culture”12 to frame a second collective memory: a “collective memory of 
 
 7   See discussion infra Section III.C.2 (discussing how the legislature ultimately passed legislation that failed to provide 
sufficient, funding, resources, and independence). 
 8   TRASK, supra note 4 (describing such”political myths” fabricated by foreigners to Hawai‘i across time). 
 9   See also Maurice Halbwachs, From the Collective Memory, in THEORIES OF MEMORY: A READER 143 (Michael 
Rossington & Anne Whitehead, eds., 2007) (“History can be represented as the universal memory of the human species. But 
there is no universal memory. Every collective memory requires the support of a group delimited in space and time.”). 
 10   Serrano, supra note 3, at 359 (emphasis omitted). 
 11   Eric K. Yamamoto & Catherine Corpus Betts, Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: 
The Story of Rice v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 558 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008). 
 12   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1765 (“[C]ontests over historical memory regularly take place on the terrain 
of culture—of which legal process, and particularly civil rights adjudication, is one, but only one, significant aspect.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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injustice.”13 As such, Section III.B weaves together in detail an often untold story of ordinary 
people—a former janitor and a recent law school graduate—who capitalized on the seismic shift in 
the cultural and political landscape to reframe the injustices against Kānaka Maoli and eventually 
succeed in obtaining reparative action. Section III.C then critiques the legislative backlash and 
politicking that occurred in the minority-led Hawai‘i legislature immediately after the creation of 
OHA to illuminate how “selective amnesia”14 worked to reconstruct yet a third framing of Hawai‘i’s 
collective memory. This third “local” collective memory weaponized the colonizer-colonized dynamic 
of the master narrative to deflect blame for Hawaiian injustices solely to a white colonizer and away 
from “local” non-white settler communities. This Article, therefore, shows how collective memory in 
post-colonial contexts can be contested even between subordinated groups, thereby demonstrating 
the complex ways collective memory is deployed in struggles for power. 
Finally, this Article concludes by drawing upon the experiences of the late-1970s to suggest 
strategies to reassess collective memory and the potential for reparative action under Hawai‘i’s current 
socio-political tensions. Indeed, current events in Hawai‘i vivify the continued Native Hawaiian quest 
for justice for historical harms and have catalyzed resistance reminiscent of the 1970s.15 This untold 
story of that era of change provides insight and a cautionary tale for those seeking justice today. As 
Kānaka Maoli believe, “O ke au i hala ka lamakū, ke ala i ke kupukupu . . . The past is the beacon that 
will guide us into the future.”16 
I. HISTORY, LAW, AND THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF INJUSTICE 
History is always inseparable from the law.17 Not only do legislators and politicians create 
laws that respond to historical inequities,18 but for jurists, lawyers, legal scholars, and politicians, 
history is essential to “better understand the origin of rules” to make “present day arguments as to 
why these rules should be changed.”19 In the context of the American judicial system, 
 
 13   Id. at 1764 (describing “group memory of injustice” as “characterized by active, collective conscious construction of 
the past” that “emerges from interactions among people, institutions, media, and other cultural forms” in recalling past events). 
 14   See Margit Cohn, When, and Where, Does History Begin? Collective Memory, Selective Amnesia, and the Treatment of Asylum 
Seekers in Israel, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 563, 601 (2017) (referring to selective amnesia as the “simultaneous remembering and 
forgetting of a collective memory by a single person, group, or society based on the context at hand”). 
 15   Id. 
 16   MARY KAWENA PUKU‘I, ‘ŌLELO NO‘EAU: HAWAIIAN PROVERBS AND POETICAL SAYINGS (1983); see also Kau‘i P. 
Goodhue, We Are Who We Were: From Resistence to Affirmation, 1 ŌIWI: A NATIVE HAWAIIAN J. 36, 36 (1998) (“‘O ke au i hala ka 
lamakū, ke ala i ke kupukupu, goes a Hawaiian saying. The past is the beacon that will guide us into the future.”). 
 17   See Troy J.H. Andrade, (Re)Righting History: Deconstructing the Court’s Narrative of Hawai‘i’s Past, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 
631, 634 (2017) [hereinafter (Re)Righting History]. 
 18   See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (1988) (apologizing for the “evacuation, 
relocation, and internment” of those of Japanese ancestry during World War II and making restitution payments to all 
internees); Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) (apologizing to Native Hawaiians for American 
involvement in the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i and committing the federal government to reconciliation efforts). 
 19   Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit Theory: The Case of Racial Transformations Circa the Spanish 
American War, 1896-1900, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 921, 940 (2001). 
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history is a methodological tool that is imbedded in the principle of stare decisis; 
courts use history as a way to document how legal issues were decided in order to 
predict the outcome of future cases. The entire premise of litigation itself is to 
determine what occurred in the past, who was at fault for such conduct, and whose 
story is more convincing. History is also used to define legislative intent. When the 
text of a statute is ambiguous, courts will resort to an analysis of legislative 
materials such as drafts of the legislation, committee reports, speeches from 
legislators, and testimony received during the committee hearings. These resources 
provide a toolkit for a court to ascertain what legislators were intending in passing 
the law. History, thus, serves as a way for a court to legitimize its decision.20 
When deployed to change the law, history is a weapon in a lawyer’s arsenal to critique legal 
principles; a lawyer can argue that a particular decision was historically wrong and therefore push for 
its demise. This broad use of history, however, misses what Professor Eric K. Yamamoto argues is 
the central struggle in battles over resolving past societal harms.21 The traditional or “pure” historical 
approach ignores the “archives of mind, spirit, and culture—then and now.”22 As Yamamoto 
describes, “[s]ocial understandings of historical injustice are largely constructed in the present. Those 
understandings are rooted less in backward-looking searches for ‘what happened’ than in the present-
day dynamics of collective memory.”23 In this light, understanding the theoretical origins of collective 
memory and its potential power as a tool for reparative change sets a foundation to decipher the 
constitutional and legislative changes that transpired in Hawai‘i from 1978 to 1980. 
A. Origins of Collective Memory 
Yamamoto’s work on collective memory builds upon sociological, psychoanalytic, and 
critical historical literatures analyzing the importance of group memory. The sociologist and 
philosopher Émile Durkheim argued that societies adopt “collective representations.”24 These 
 
 20   See (Re)Righting History, supra note 17, at 634 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 21   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1764 (“The struggle over recognition of competing collective memories is 
therefore often a struggle over the supremacy of world views, of colliding ideologies.”). 
 22   Id. 
 23   Id. at 1757; see also Halbwachs, supra note 9, at 139 (“Undoubtedly, history is a collection of the most notable facts in 
the memory of man. But past events read about in books and taught and learned in schools are selected, combined, and 
evaluated in accord with necessities and rules not imposed on the groups that had through time guarded them as a living 
trust.”). 
 24   ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 330 (Carol Cosman trans., 2008) (“[C]oncepts 
are collective representations. If they are common to a whole social group, this is not because they represent a simple average 
among corresponding individual representations; for then they would be poorer than these (individual representations) in 
intellectual content, while in reality they are rich with a knowledge that surpasses that of the average individual. They are not 
abstractions that would have reality only in particular minds but representations every bit as concrete as those that the 
individual can construct from his personal surroundings: they correspond to the way in which that special entity, society, thinks 
about the things from its own experience.”). 
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collective representations are meanings or symbols that become associated with a group’s identity.25 
These symbols, he believed, were collectively conceived by and belonging to the group.26 In his 1912 
book, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim highlighted the power of group—as opposed to 
individual—memory.27 Maurice Halbwachs, a student of Durkheim, drew a connection between 
group memory of the past and that memory’s power in the present,28 coining the term “collective 
memory” to “emphasize the way even individual memories are formed socially, through families, 
religious communities, and even social classes.”29 He described how memories are “linked to ideas we 
share with many others, to people, groups, places, dates, words and linguistic forms, theories and 
ideas with the whole material and moral framework of the society of which we are part.”30 These 
ideas in turn create “collectively shared representations of the past.”31 For Halbwachs, the past we 
know “is always constructed” and the “present-day interests of social actors profoundly affect our 
understanding of the past.”32 Halbwachs’ “presentist” claim is, therefore, that “most groups . . . 
engrave their form in some way upon the soil” and retrieve those collective remembrances at a 
subsequent point in time.33 
The works of Durkheim and Halbwachs lay the foundation for the multi-disciplinary 
research on the study of collective memory.34 The sociologist and historian Jeffrey Olick categorized 
 
 25   Id. 
 26   Id. 
 27   Id. at 329–31.  
 28   Peter J. Verovšek, Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past: The Politics of Memory as a Research Paradigm, 4 
POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES 529, (2016). 
 29   Ariela Gross, The Constitution of History and Memory, in LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: AN INTRODUCTION 418 (Austin 
Sara, et al, eds., 2010); see also Halbwachs, supra note 9 (“History can be represented as the universal memory of the human 
species. But there is no universal memory. Every collective memory requires the support of a group delimited in space and 
time.”). 
 30   Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie & D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, A Collective Memory of Injustice: Reclaiming Hawai‘i’s Crown 
Lands Trust in Response to Judge James S. Burns, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 487–88 (2017) (citation omitted); see also Pierre Nora, 
Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire, in THEORIES OF MEMORY: A READER 145–46 (Michael Rossington & Anne 
Whitehead, eds., 2007) (“Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open 
to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. . . . Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a 
bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past. Memory, insofar as it is affective and magical, only 
accommodates those facts that suit it; it nourishes recollections that may be out of focus or telescopic, global or detached, 
particular or symbolic—responsive to each avenue of conveyance or phenomenal screen, to every censorship or projection.”). 
 31   Gross, supra note 29, at 418 (quoting Wulf Kansteiner, Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective 
Memory Studies, 41 HISTORY & THEORY 179, 181 (2002)). 
 32   Joachim J. Savelsberg & Ryan D. King, Institutionalizing Collective Memories of Hate: Law and Law Enforcement in Germany 
and the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 579, 582 (2005). 
 33   Cohn, supra note 14, at 569 (citation omitted). 
 34   See Gross, supra note 29, at 417-19 (noting the burgeoning field and ascension of memory studies in the humanities 
attributable to the starting point of Halbwachs’ definition of collective memory, work of Pierre Nora, the rise of psychoanalytic 
theory to the study of the past, nationalist history, public “ferment” stirred trials and debates addressing the aftermath of the 
Holocaust, and the “important tradition of tracing the relationship between history and memory in Jewish history.”) 
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the various fields of collective memory research into three distinct areas captured by the following 
research questions: “what do we do with the past; what does the past do for us; and what does the past 
do to us.”35 As Professor Margit Cohn describes: 
Under this taxonomy, the first question, which can be rephrased as “how is the 
past used,” has inspired studies of carriers of collective memory, that is, the agents 
and vehicles that contribute to its evolution. These are concerned with social and 
cultural constructs that are either culturally or socially emergent (or both), such as 
commemoration practices, cultural artifacts, museums, and, in Pierre Nora’s words, 
“realms of memory.” Presentists and those concerned with strategic uses of past 
memories, offer distinct responses to the second question. The third question, in 
Olick’s view, is central to those who focus on trauma and its impact on collective 
identity.36 
Collective memory work in the legal field focuses primarily on the role of the courts. 
Yamamoto, for example, critiques Rice v. Cayetano for framing a narrative of Hawaiian history that 
altered collective memory to deny reparative action for Native Hawaiians.37 Similarly, in the context 
of the denial of the right to vote in presidential elections for Puerto Ricans, Serrano uses collective 
memory theory to assess the First Circuit’s decision in Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States.38 Some 
collective memory work has focused on quasi-judicial bodies, such as truth commissions, as carriers 
of collective memory in response to a particular traumatic event.39 Such legal scholarship centers 
collective memory within the context of transitional justice—that is, “legal responses to regime 
change or democratization in formerly unjust societies.”40 
Other legal scholarship, although not as robust, focuses on collective memory’s impact on 
the shaping of law and policies.41 Deliberative bodies, such as constitutional conventions or 
legislatures, are, like judicial bodies, apt sites for the framing or reframing of a collective memory. 
Indeed, constitutions and statutes often contain explicit references to the past. More fundamentally, 
 
 35   See Cohn, supra note 14, at 570 (citing Jeffrey K. Olick, From Usable Pasts to the Return of the Repressed, 9 HEDGEHOG 
REV. 19, 20-21 (2007)). 
 36   Id. at 570–71. 
 37   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1766-77. 
 38   See Serrano, supra note 3, at 408-28. More recently, Professors Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie and D. Kapua‘ala 
Sproat used the collective memory framework to critique a historically flawed law review article written by a highly respected 
jurist about Native Hawaiian claims to lands. See MacKenzie & Sproat, supra note 30, at 499-533. 
 39   See Gross, supra note 29, at 431 (analyzing a range of scholar’s arguments for the merits and limits of using truth 
and reconciliation commissions to promote restorative justice). 
 40   See id. at 423.  
 41   See Cohn, supra note 14, at 565 (“Constitutional-law scholarship can be especially enriched by this body of research: 
constitutions are affected by the past as much as they are the result of the needs of the present.”); see also Lu‘ukia Nakanelua, 
Comment, Nā Mo‘o o Ko‘olau: The Water Guardians of Ko‘olau Weaving and Wielding Collective Memory in the War for East Maui Water, 
41 U. HAW. L. REV. 189, 227-39 (2018) (interrogating the battle over collective memory in relation to passage of a bill regarding 
access to water). 
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constitutions both “respond to past structures and are impacted by them.”42 The creation, nature, and 
evolving meanings of constitutional and statutory provisions beyond mere text necessarily require a 
socio-historic analysis.43 For example, it would be disingenuous to assert that interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution meant divorcing critiques of the framers’ intent or the Federalist Papers, and equally 
disingenuous to interpret those same provisions without recognizing the context of African slavery 
and the dispossession and genocide of Native America.44 Such decontextualization undermines the 
robust and multi-layered facets of lawmaking and the law’s impact on justice claims. 
B. Power of a Collective Memory of Injustice 
In the legal context, to frame these collective memories, “[i]ndividuals, social groups, 
institutions, and nations filter and twist, recall and forget ‘information’ in reframing shameful past 
acts (thereby lessening responsibility) as well as in enhancing victim status (thereby increasing 
power).”45 A decision by a policymaker or judge to select a particular history to tell “is determined by 
a sifting of the relevant from the irrelevant—a process itself affected by the decision[]maker’s cultural 
framework.”46 This cultural framework is often dictated by the decisionmaker’s “social perceptions, 
beliefs, and practices that form the lens through which . . . [they] see[] and evaluate[] both daily 
happenings and society as a whole.”47 Other institutions, such as scholarship and mass media, 
necessarily mediate this framework before they affect collective memories. 
Discussions of remembering or ascertaining a group memory implies an equally active 
process of forgetting. This concept of forgetting, referred to in the literature as “selective amnesia,” 
developed in tandem with the study of memory and highlights the central battle over the construction 
of the past.48 Within the context of legal redress concerning slavery, for example, Professor Lawrie 
Balfour draws upon the writings of W.E.B. Du Bois to suggest that a “willful national amnesia 
prevented black citizens from enjoying in fact the freedom and equality they were guaranteed by 
 
 42   See Cohn, supra note 14, at 565. 
 43   Id. at 568. 
 44   Similarly, the collective memory of Brown v. Board of Education as the harbinger of racial equality in the United States 
erases the limited effect that decision had on actual equality, which did not truly manifest until passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 10 (2008) 
(arguing that a court is unable to produce significant social reform because of “the limited nature of constitutional rights, the 
lack of judicial independence, and the judiciary’s inability to develop appropriate policies and its lack of powers of 
implementation”). Within the context of public school desegregation, Rosenberg asserts, “Congressional and executive branch 
action . . . was virtually non-existent until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” Id. at 46. Similarly, some argued that 
meaningful desegregation did not occur until Lyndon B. Johnson became President over a decade after Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and took affirmative action to secure passage of the Civil Rights Act. See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE 
FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 452 (2006). 
 45   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1758. 
 46   See Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 11, at 565. 
 47   Id. at 565; see also Serrano, supra note 3, at 364 (describing legislators as “engage[d] dialectically with other dominant 
political institutions, with [people’s] preexisting cultural assumptions, and [with] other sources of cultural authority”). 
 48   See Cohn, supra note 14, at 571. 
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law.”49 Balfour claims that the suppression of a critical reflection of slavery in the nation’s collective 
memory impedes legal redress through reparations for the legacy of that slavery.50 Thus, 
decisionmakers have the “narrative power to reframe the past so as to include certain events and 
people, exclude others, and redefine the meaning of landscape accordingly.”51 
These collective memories are “linked to ideas we share with many others, to people, 
groups, places, dates, words and linguistic forms, theories and ideas, that is, with the whole material 
and moral framework of the society of which we are part.”52 These memories, unlike reciting “pure” 
history,53 are “constructed and continually reconstructed” as individuals grow and their ideologies and 
opinions change.54 These group memories thereby “shape the way in which racial wounds are 
aggravated or salved,”55 because “[h]ow a community frames past events and connects them to 
current conditions often determines the power of justice claims or opposition to them.”56 
Importantly, as Professor Martha Minow recognizes, although collective memory is constructed, 
external forces such as culture, politics, and economics limit the control over framing that a person or 
group can have in reconstructing that memory.57 
For marginalized communities, reparative action occurs when those in power frame the past 
as a collective memory of injustice—that is, a framing in which the historic injustice against that 
community is highlighted and centered as the collective memory to be inscribed. An analysis of a 
historical event under the collective memory of injustice framework reconstructs the event, “thereby 
situat[ing] a group in relation to others in a power hierarchy.”58 To this end, Yamamoto articulates 
five strategic points for critiquing past harms. 59 First, lawmakers must “at the outset critically engage 
 
 49   Lawrie Balfour, Unreconstructed Democracy: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Case for Reparations, 97 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 33, 33 
(2003) (synthesizing Du Bois’s scholarship, arguing that “the unwillingness to confront the past is connected to the failures of 
formal equality as an antidote to the poison of racial injustice,” and concluding that the argument for reparations for slavery 
implicates “a structure of memory and critique” whereby legal redress for slavery via reparations is “centrally a story of 
memory’s suppression”). 
 50   Id. at 33. 
 51   William Cronon, A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1347, 1364 (1992). Research 
suggests that memory also serves a unique role as a form of identity creation that is necessary for community and advocacy. See 
Savelsberg & King, supra note 32, at 584 (“Collective memory and commemorations do not only affect future 
commemorations but also events in which decisions are debated and made on laws, enforcement organizations, and control 
actions.”). 
 52   See MacKenzie & Sproat, supra note 30, at 488. 
 53   Michal Shur-Ofry & Guy Pessach, Robotic Collective Memory, 97 WASH U. L. REV. 975, 980 (2020) (“Although often 
relying on historical accounts, collective memory is not synonymous with history. Since it is a product of social construct, it has 
subjective and normative dimensions, and can more easily encompass a multiplicity of voices and meanings.”). 
 54   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1760. 
 55   Id. at 1757. 
 56   See Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 11, at 558. 
 57   See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND 
MASS VIOLENCE 118–20 (1998) (describing how political leaders oscillate between remembering and forgetting memories to 
change the public’s view of events or societies). 
 58   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1758. 
 59   Id. at 1764-65. 
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the dynamics of group memory of injustice.”60 These dynamics, including the ways decisionmakers 
filter and interpret images, ideas, and recollections “to present particular understandings of the past,” 
transcend physical boundaries and intragroup affinities.61 Second, such group memory of injustice is 
“characterized by the active, collective construction of the past.”62 Collective memory is, therefore, 
not a simple static recounting of the past, but is instead a process altered by present-day conditions, 
such as interactions among people, institutions, media, scholarship, and other cultural forms.63 Third, 
collective memory is “always hotly contested” because any action on historical claims of injustice 
“turn[] on which memories are acknowledged by decision-makers.”64 These first three strategic points 
involve an assessment of the power of legal decisionmakers, such as judges, politicians, or delegates at 
a constitutional convention, their views of the collective memory as shaped by their own present-day 
sifting of the relevant and irrelevant, and their willingness to use a collective memory of injustice to 
make legal change. Without a seat at the table or allies willing to advocate for a new collective 
memory, marginalized communities face an uphill struggle to correct historical injustices. It is, 
therefore, important to have the right people strategically placed in decision-making positions to 
advocate a collective memory of injustice. 
Under Yamamoto’s fourth strategic point, “contests over historical memory regularly take 
place on the terrain of culture—of which legal process, and particularly civil rights adjudication, is 
one, but only one, significant aspect.”65 Those in power interpret popular-cultural images and day to 
day cultural practices to further frame the collective memory.66 Yamamoto’s final point emphasizes 
the importance of working with “legal process and rights claims” to “achieve the specific legal result 
and to contribute to construction of social memory as a political tool.”67 These two points highlight 
that the critical work of framing a collective memory of injustice must occur within a context 
conducive to making those changes. Deeply held collective memories cannot be changed within a 
vacuum; change must be made within the context of mass mobilization of the community to support 
justice where justice has been readily denied.68 There is, therefore, a right time for advocates to push 
 
 60   Id. at 1764. 
 61   See MacKenzie & Sproat, supra note 30, at 488; see also Shur-Ofry & Pessach, supra note 53, at 981 (“Relatedly, 
multiple sources affect the formation of collective memory. A non-exhaustive list includes historical and documentary 
materials, formal and informal studies, media coverage, visits to physical sites, as well as community rituals and witness 
testimonies.”). 
 62   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1764. 
 63   Id. at 1765 (“Indeed, struggles over memory are often struggles between colliding ideologies, or vastly differing 
world views.”). 
 64   Id. 
 65   Id. 
 66   Id. 
 67   Id. (emphasis added). 
 68   A contemporary example is apt. Despite years of attempts to have Mississippi remove the Confederate flag from its 
state flag, only in 2020 did the state pass legislation to redesign the flag. Rick Rojas, Mississippi Lawmakers Vote to Retire State Flag 
Rooted in the Confederacy, N.Y. TIMES, (June 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/us/mississippi-flag-
confederacy.html [https://perma.cc/WZZ7-M94E]. This legislation came in response to the significant mobilization across the 
United States that occurred after the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery, and the calls for the 
removal of memorials and symbols of the Confederacy. See Giacomo Bologna, Mississippi Voted to Keep its State Flag in 2001. A 
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for a collective memory of injustice. 
These insights help to tease out and understand particular moments. They also underscore 
the power of collective memory to advance or undermine claims for historical injustices. Thus, the 
key to restorative justice and successful inscription of a collective memory of injustice is to have the 
right people, at the right time, with the right tools.69 
The following case study analyzes the mobilized resistance and challenges to the master 
narrative at the 1978 Hawai‘i constitutional convention and subsequent legislative sessions. It 
illuminates Yamamoto’s theory of the battles over collective memory of injustice and illustrates the 
significance of those battles to addressing justice claims in lawmaking. 
II. THE COLONIZER’S MEMORY: CONSTRUCTING A MASTER NARRATIVE OF HAWAI‘I 
To grasp how lawmakers reframed a collective memory of injustice in 1978, it is important 
first to understand the colonizer’s story of Hawai‘i (referred to here as the master narrative) and its 
themes. Unsurprisingly, this master narrative—like many master narratives that suppress indigenous 
communities—is a collective memory that erases native resistance, legitimizes land seizure, and 
situates power with non-natives.70 
There are three starting points for the master narrative—all of which center the beginning of 
Hawai‘i in America or Europe. For some, Hawai‘i’s narrative begins on December 7, 1941, that “day 
of infamy” when the Japanese empire attacked American military installations at Pearl Harbor and 
thrust America into World War II.71 Hawai‘i’s story for others begins on August 21, 1959, the day 
Hawai‘i became the fiftieth state. But, for most Western historians or social scientists, Hawai‘i begins 
“[a]t dawn on January 18, 1778,” when English Captain James Cook “discovers” the islands and 
encounters the “wildness” of the first Kānaka Maoli that greeted him.72 Under the master narrative, 
 
Lot has Changed Since Then, CLARION LEDGER, (June 8, 2020), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/politics/2020/06/
08/mississippi-flag-confederate-emblem-time-reconsider-protests-george-floyd/5318216002/ [https://perma.cc/Q85P-Y6TZ] 
(noting the activism following the death of George Floyd as a precursor for the renewed conversation about the Mississippi 
flag). 
 69   See MINOW, supra note 57, at 119 (“[M]emory becomes a political tool . . . “). 
 70   LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 33 (1999) 
(“Our orientation to the world was already being redefined as we were being excluded systematically from the writing of the 
history of our own lands.”). These one-sided narratives erase native resistance to assure colonizing powers that they are 
welcomed as heroes. See id. (“We have often allowed our ‘histories’ to be told and have then become outsiders as we heard 
them being retold.”); NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO AMERICAN COLONIALISM 
2-3 (2004). 
 71   TOM COFFMAN, NATION WITHIN: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S ANNEXATION OF THE NATION OF HAWAI‘I xiv 
(1999) (noting that “the effective definition of history had been reduced to a few years” and that December 7, 1941, was 
“practically the beginning of time, and anything that might have happened before that was prehistory”). 
 72   GAVAN DAWS, SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 1 (1974); LAWRENCE FUCHS, HAWAII 
PONO: A SOCIAL HISTORY 3 (1961) (“In 1778, Hawaii had been discovered by the English explorer Captain James Cook . . . 
“); JAMES COOK, THE EXPLORATIONS OF CAPTAIN JAMES COOK IN THE PACIFIC 1776-1780, 216–17 (A. Greenfell Price, ed. 
1967) (“[T]heir eyes were continually flying from object to object, the wildness of [their] looks and actions fully express[ed] 
their surprise and astonishment. . . .”). 
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and given the “feudal” land system governed by warring and despotic rulers, life for the indigenous 
people was “not altogether idyllic,” as they simply found “beauty and pleasure in their island 
existence . . . .”73 The master narrative often discusses Kamehameha, a “far from handsome” man 
who had a “savage” looking face, who, with the assistance of Western weaponry, unified the 
Hawaiian people under his rule.74 Kamehameha’s descendants abolished the alleged old and 
regressive kapu system, established the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, and adopted a constitutional 
monarchical system of government.75 
The colonizer’s story continues in 1820 when New England missionaries arrived in Hawai‘i 
and “sought to teach Hawaiians to abandon religious beliefs and customs that were contrary to 
Christian teachings and practices.”76 According to Gavan Daws—whose 1968 book, Shoal of Times: A 
History of the Hawaiian Islands, is often credited as the most popular and most-often cited modern 
treatment of Hawai‘i’s history77—”Hawaiians, of course, were savages as well as sinner,” yet “the 
Gospel would be the civilizing instrument, and Hawaiian civilization would be a Christian 
civilization.”78 Moreover, Hawaiians were portrayed as lazy, lewd, and childish, with an “appearance 
of destitution, degradation, and barbarism.”79 Missionaries began converting the nobility and became 
involved in politics and lawmaking.80 According to the master narrative, the values and priorities of 
the missionaries and other Europeans heavily influenced Hawaiian chiefs to adopt Western notions 
of governance and land tenure.81 In 1850, in a process the master narrative refers to as the “Great” 
Māhele, Kingdom leaders privatized all lands.82 Hawaiian chiefs squandered land and resources and 
left nothing for the Native Hawaiian people, who were succumbing to foreign disease and famine. 
Indeed, Western historians’ estimates of the decimation place the population decline from between 
300,000 and 400,000 Native Hawaiians in 1778 to approximately 57,000 in 1866.83 
 
 73   See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 500–01 (2000) (describing a feudal land system where, “[i]n Cook’s time the 
islands were ruled by four different kings, and intra-Hawaiian wars could inflict great loss and suffering. Kings or principal 
chieftains, as well as high priests, could order the death or sacrifice of any subject”). 
 74   See DAWS, supra note 72, at 32. 
 75   See id. at 66, 125. 
 76   Rice, 528 U.S. at 501. 
 77   See, e.g., Rice, 528 U.S. at 500 (citing G. DAWS, SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS xii-xiii 
(1968)); Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (D. Haw. 2003) (same). 
 78   See DAWS, supra note 72, at 62. 
 79   Id. at 64. 
 80   Id. at 66-67, 124-28. 
 81   See DAWS, supra note 72, at 124-28. This view erases agency of Kānaka Maoli leaders, who actively merged Western 
governance structures with Hawaiian customs and within a Hawaiian worldview. See KAMANAMAIKALANI BEAMER, NO 
MĀKOU KA MANA: LIBERATING THE NATION 12 (2014). 
 82   See DAWS, supra note 72, at 124-28. 
 83   DAVID E. STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF HAWAII ON THE EVE OF WESTERN 
CONTACT xvi, 3-5 (1989); see also 152 Cong. Rec. S. 5,558 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Daniel Kahikina Akaka) 
(stating during a motion to proceed for the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2005 that “[b]y 1866, only 
57,000 Native Hawaiians remained from the basically stable pre-1778 population of at least 300,000”); David E. Stannard, 
Disease and Infertility: A New Look at the Demographic Collapse of Native Populations in the Wake of Western Contact, 24 J. AM. STUDIES 
325 (1990) (describing the ideological motivations for Western population estimates). 
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In 1893, in what many adherents of the master narrative frame as the “Hawaiian 
Revolution,”84 Kingdom citizens closely allied with American business interests “replaced” the Native 
Hawaiian sovereign and her government with a new Provisional Government that would immediately 
seek annexation by the United States.85 In his memoirs, lead “revolutionist” Lorrin A. Thurston 
dedicated his recounting of the “Revolution” to “the brave and faithful men who, without 
expectation of reward, undertook and accomplished a tedious and dangerous task: the rescue of a 
community from arbitrary and unjust government and oppression . . . “86 The master narrative frames Queen 
Lili‘uokalani, the “replaced” sovereign, as lazy, autocratic, inefficient, corrupt, and undependable,87 
therefore justifying the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i as an attempt to replace the tyranny 
and greed of monarchical control with a democratic form of government representative of and 
welcomed by “the people.”88 
With annexation to the United States at the fore of their minds, the revolutionists dubbed 
themselves the Provisional Government and, after holding a constitutional convention, created the 
Republic of Hawai‘i in 1894.89 Subsequently, in 1898, President William McKinley signed a Joint 
Resolution that annexed Hawai‘i to the United States.90 Hawai‘i then officially became United States 
 
 84   See LORRIN A. THURSTON, MEMOIRS OF THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION 1 (Andrew Farrell, ed. 1936); SANFORD B. 
DOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION 1 (Andres Farrell, ed. 1936); see also DAWS, supra note 72, at 277 (“The 
Hawaiian revolution had come too soon or too late, and much as Harrison sympathized with its aims there was little he could 
do for Thurston and his colleagues.”); FUCHS, supra note 72, at 31 (“The Committee of Safety, which was to spearhead the 
revolution, was led by Thurston, advised by Stevens, and dignified through the support of one of the great names in Hawaiian 
history, Sanford Ballard Dole.”). 
 85   Rice, 528 U.S. at 505. The master narrative often downplays American involvement in the overthrow and the 
pivotal role played by United States diplomat John L. Stevens and the U.S. Marines. See American Overthrow, supra note 2, at 8 
(“American Minister Stevens also took the opportunity to send a letter marked ‘Private’ on official U.S. Legation letterhead to 
Justice Sanford B. Dole, in which he wrote: ‘I would advise not to make known of my recognition of the de facto Provisional 
Government until said Government is in possession of the Police Station.’”). 
 86   THURSTON, supra note 84, at xi (emphasis added). But see American Overthrow, supra note 2, at 4-11 (detailing the 
plotting and preordained American support of the overthrow of the Kingdom). 
 87   See SILVA, supra note 70, at 165-67; WILLIAM ADAM RUSS, JR., THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION (1893-1894) 29 (1959) 
(“Lili‘uokalani was not a good Queen. That is certain.”). 
 88   See, e.g., THURSTON TWIGG-SMITH, HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY: DO THE FACTS REALLY MATTER? 86-87 (1998) 
(“Revolutionists believed the people of Hawai‘i would support them, as popular opinion in America and France had supported 
those earlier revolutions. . . . Why was there no mass uprising in Hawai‘i against the Revolution? In part, because in the 
opinions of Native and Caucasian leaders expressed in 1898, the Revolution of 1893 and the subsequent Annexation of Hawaii 
by the United States were the best things that could have happened to the people of these Islands at that point in history.”); 
THURSTON, supra note 84, at 153 (describing the institution of the Bayonet Constitution upon Lili‘uokalani’s brother as “not in 
accordance with law; neither was the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain. Both were revolutionary documents, 
which had to be forcibly effected and forcibly maintained”). 
 89   Sanford B. Dole, a lead conspirator in the overthrow and leader of the Provisional Government, drafted the 1894 
constitution of the Republic of Hawaii. See Alfred L. Castle, Advice for Hawaii: The Dole-Burgess Letters, 15 HAWAIIAN J. OF 
HISTORY 24, 29 (1981). 
 90   The Western historians’ narratives erase the considerable resistance to annexation plans and the two failed attempts 
to annex Hawai‘i by treaty. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Darkness Over Hawaii: The Annexation Myth is the Greatest Obstacle to 
Progress, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L & POL’Y J. 70, 71-75 (2015) (questioning the validity of Hawai‘i’s annexation). Importantly, the 
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Territory in 1900.91 The master narrative then recognizes that during the territorial period, White 
plantation owners and businessmen who led the 1893 “Revolution” and the push for annexation, 
consolidated political and economic control of the territorial government.92 The oligarchy that they 
created thrived because of the subjugated non-White immigrants—Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, 
Okinawan, Korean, Puerto Rican, and Filipino—who worked in the bustling plantations under harsh 
labor conditions.93 
Eventually, these “immigrant” communities unite and mobilize politically in resistance to the 
concentrated power of the White oligarchy, remaking Hawai‘i as a “melting pot.”94 As these struggles 
develop, Hawai‘i entered the global arena after the 1941 Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. The 
government thereafter instituted martial law and, while the federal government incarcerated those of 
Japanese ancestry – including American citizens, in concentration camps – most Japanese Americans 
in Hawai‘i did not face a similar fate.95 The master narrative instead highlights stories of the heroism 
and patriotism of Japanese-American soldiers of the famed and highly decorated 100th Infantry 
Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team, who, despite facing discrimination, returned to 
Hawai‘i after fighting deadly battles for democracy overseas.96 The “triumphant” return of the Nisei 
solders and the unifying force of the labor movement combined to reach a high point in 1954 when 
the Democratic party seized control of the Territorial Legislature through the ballot box.97 In 1959, 
the multiethnic people of Hawai‘i resoundingly supported statehood, and with America’s permission, 
Hawai‘i became the fiftieth state.98 
 
resistance against annexation was readily available in the Hawaiian language, a resource Western historians did not, and in some 
cases refused, to consider. 
 91   Act of Apr. 30, 1900, Pub. L. No. 56-339, § 2, 3 Stat. 141, 141. 
 92   See, e.g., Castle, supra note 89 (describing how under the 1894 constitution, lead conspirator of the 1893 
“Revolution,” Sanford B. Dole, implemented substantial property qualifications, voting eligibility tests, and a requirement that 
all office holders take an oath to the new Republic). Dole further disenfranchised Kānaka Maoli and effectuated a political 
system that legitimized the theft of Hawaiian sovereignty. 
 93   See Laura Edles, Rethinking ‘Race’, ‘Ethnicity’ and ‘Culture’: Is Hawai‘i the ‘Model Minority’ State?, 27 ETHNIC AND 
RACIAL STUDIES 37, 51-52 (discussing the ways white plantation and business owners exploited laborers of varying ethnic and 
racial identitites with particularly harsh treatment of Chinese and Japanese laborers as well as Native Hawaiians). 
 94   See id. at 40 (explaining how Hawai‘i is often discussed as a “melting pot” while critiquing how this conception 
glosses over the history of violent American colonialism and “complex workings of racialization”). 
 95   See HARRY N. SCHEIBER & JANE L. SCHEIBER, BAYONETS IN PARADISE: MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAI‘I DURING 
WORLD WAR II (2016). 
 96   See DAWS, supra note 72, at 383. 
 97   TOM COFFMAN, THE ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF HAWAI‘I 151–54 (2003) [hereinafter 
ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA] 
 98   Western historians parade the vote in support of statehood as a sign that Native Hawaiians willingly accepted 
statehood and thereby renounced claim to a restored independent nation. See, e.g., TWIGG-SMITH, supra note 88, at 130 (noting 
that that plebiscite taken during statehood “showed more than 90 percent of Hawaii voters, Native Hawaiians and otherwise, in 
favor of the [statehood] relationship with America”). The vote for statehood, however, was deficient because: (1) the 1959 
plebiscite did not include an option for “independence,” which should have been afforded voters under international law, see 
G.A. Res. 742 (VIII), at 21–22 (Nov. 27, 1953) (outlining factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a 
Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, November 27, 1953, 
item 33); and (2) the 1959 plebiscite vote improperly included settler populations. See S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People 
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The master narrative of Hawai‘i thus describes a progression of political power from an 
uncivilized society in 1778, to a greedy and inefficient Kingdom, to a series of temporary 
governments, to the democratic and free fiftieth State in 1959. The arc of this nearly 200-year 
narrative moves the reader from chaos and violence to stability and peace. In this telling, Hawai‘i 
represents the American Dream, where all people—whether “settler” or “immigrant”99—can, 
through hard work, seize control of their destiny—and the Hawaiian islands.100 As Lawrence Fuchs 
wrote in his 1961 book Hawaii Pono: A Social History: 
Hawaii illustrates the nation’s revolutionary message of equality of opportunity for 
all, regardless of background, color or religion. This is the promise of Hawaii, a 
promise for the entire nation and, indeed, the world, that peoples of different races 
and creeds can live together, enriching each other, in harmony and democracy.101 
In this master narrative, the colonizer racializes Kānaka Maoli as undeserving and unable to 
govern and make productive their land.102 Due in significant part to an unwillingness to engage with 
the rich and voluminous materials published in the Hawaiian language,103 the master narrative 
downplays the story of Americanization and instead portrays Hawaiians as passive and often willing 
contributors to their own displacement.104 Fundamentally, the master narrative sidelines grievances 
 
and International Human Rights: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309, 334 (1994) (arguing that the 
“plebiscite procedures allowed the majority of settler populations to overpower the voice of the Native Hawaiian people who 
were uniquely interested in a Hawaii reconstituted in accordance with self-determination values”). 
 99   See Saito, supra note 6, at 28-29 (describing a triangulated analysis, which eliminates the settler-indigenous binary by 
distinguishing “migrants who are not intended to become part of the settler class from both settlers and Indigenous peoples”). 
 100   See discussion infra Section III.C.2 (discussing settler colonialism and the myth of “locals” in Hawai‘i). 
 101   See FUCHS, supra note 72, at 449. 
 102   See discussion infra Section III.C.1 (discussing the racialization of Native Hawaiians); see also ALBERT MEMMI, THE 
COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED 69-76 (1965) (describing the colonizer’s use of racism); Susan K. Serrano, Rethinking Race 
for Strict Scrutiny Purposes, Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 225 (1997) (“Racial formation is a 
sociohistorical process by which social and political forces continually create, shape and transform race, thereby imparting 
racial meaning to groups, social practices and events. Race is thus changeable rather than fixed, political rather than biological 
and value-laden rather than neutral.”); Jocelyn Linnekin, Contending Approaches, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC 
ISLANDERS, at 21 (Donald Denoon et al. eds., 1997) (noting that colonial historiography “tends to convey certain key messages 
about early encounters: that Islanders were naïve and readily responded to crude materialist appeals, that foreign introductions 
were the primary agents of change, and that first encounters with famous Europeans were the most important events in Island 
history”). 
 103   Scholars across disciplines are digging though archives and Hawaiian-language source materials and discovering a 
treasure trove of long-silenced voices—voices that provide vastly different perspectives on historical events and people in 
Hawai‘i’s history. See SILVA, supra note 70, at 3 (“By the mid-twentieth century, the idea that English was the language of 
Hawaii seemed natural, especially because . . . Hawaii was no longer regarded as a separate nation with its own people having 
their own history and language. When historians and others composed their narratives, they ‘naturally’ conducted their research 
using only the English-language sources.”); Avis Kuuipoleialoha Poai, Tales from the Dark Side of the Archives: Making History in 
Hawaii Without Hawaiians, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 575-625 (2017). 
 104   See SMITH, supra note 70, at 33 (“Schooling is directly implicated in this process. Through the curriculum and its 
underlying theory of knowledge, early schools redefined the world and where indigenous peoples were positioned within the 
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with the theft of Hawaiian sovereignty. Instead, Kānaka Maoli became the “host culture” where 
everyone was welcomed with the “aloha spirit.”105 Hawaiians take center stage, literally and 
figuratively, in supporting the commodification of their culture and an economic system heavily 
reliant on those from outside Hawai‘i. For Gavan Daws, the conclusion “that the native was unfit to 
govern himself” was “inescapable,”106 and so too was the destiny for Kānaka Maoli inevitable: 
The Hawaiians had lost much of their reasons for living long ago, when the kapus 
were abolished; since then a good many of them had lost their lives through 
disease; the survivors lost their land; they lost their leaders, because many of the 
chiefs withdrew from politics in favor of nostalgic self-indulgence; and now at last 
they lost their independence. Their resistance to all this was feeble. It was almost as 
if they believed what the white man said about them, that they had only half 
learned the lessons of civilization.107 
For decades following the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, those in power 
developed and deployed this master narrative, thereby constructing a collective memory that 
undermined Kānaka Maoli legal claims and supported American control of the islands.108 
III. HAWAI‘I ‘78: A CASE STUDY OF THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF INJUSTICE 
On September 3, 1968, James Bacon, a part-Hawaiian delegate to the State of Hawai‘i’s first 
constitutional convention, introduced a constitutional amendment requiring the state to “preserve 
and enhance the heritage and culture of the Hawaiian people and encourage continued support of 
Hawaiian traditions.”109 Delegate Bacon’s passionate recitation of the historical injustices against 
 
world. From being direct descendants of sky and earth parents, Christianity positioned some of us as higher-order savages who 
deserved salvation in order that we could become children of God.”). 
 105   Judy Rohrer, Disrupting the ‘Melting Pot’: Racial Discourse in Hawai‘i and the Naturalization of Haole, 31 ETHNIC AND 
RACIAL STUDIES 1110, 1113-14 (2008) (critiquing the arguments for Hawai‘i statehood in Hawai‘i in part based on 
mischaracterization of the welcoming Native Hawaiian “host culture” and “aloha spirit”). 
 106   See DAWS, supra note 72, at 213. 
 107   Id. at 291. 
 108   See American Overthrow, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing the annexation of Hawai‘i despite admirable efforts of 
resistance by Kingdom citizens); J. KEHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 183 (2008) (analyzing the deployment of blood quantum for purposes of determining 
beneficiaries for Hawaiian homesteading land, which enabled “white American economic, political, and social domination”); see 
also NGŨGĨ WA THIONG’O, DECOLONISING THE MIND: THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE IN AFRICAN LITERATURE 3 (1986) 
(describing this process a “cultural bomb” that “annihilate[s] a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their 
environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves,” thus “mak[ing] them 
want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves,” and resulting in “serious doubts about the moral 
rightness of struggle”). 
 109   STATE OF HAWAI‘I, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1968, VOLUME II, 
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE DEBATES 517 (1972) [hereinafter 1968 DEBATES]; STATE OF HAWAI‘I, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1968, VOLUME I, JOURNAL AND DOCUMENTS 209 (1973) [hereinafter 1968 
JOURNAL]. 
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Native Hawaiians, however, proved ineffective.110 Delegates shot his proposal down, but not before 
they forced him to defend it by saying that it was “not a laughing matter . . . .”111 But while those in 
power were not yet ready to make amends with Kānaka Maoli, the resistance outside of the 1968 
constitutional convention began to brew. 
The period leading to the creation of OHA in 1978, commonly referred to as the Hawaiian 
Renaissance, saw a reawakening of Hawaiian culture and the emergence of a people impatient for 
economic, social, and cultural justice. 112 It was a time of learning, challenging authority, and unifying 
the Hawaiian people—a “bottom-up movement” that ushered in significant legal changes.113 The 
creation story of OHA is, thus, a potent example of the reparative power of mobilizing a collective 
memory of injustice. As detailed below, the cultural and political wave that swept over Hawai‘i in the 
1970s created the right time for the right people to use the right tool of collective memory. They 
challenged and reframed the master narrative of Hawai‘i’s past and reversed the elusive path for 
reparative action for Kānaka Maoli. 
A. The Right Time: The Changed Cultural Terrain in 1978 
Building upon and alongside the resistance movements in the United States and around the 
world,114 and following the post-Vietnam ethos of challenging authority,115 Ka ̄naka Maoli began to 
 
 110   See 1968 DEBATES, supra note 109, at 518 (describing the historical decimation of Native Hawaiians, the loss of a 
Hawaiian identity, and the way in which Hawaiians “are made the butt of jokes in this State”). Delegate Hiroshi Kato, with a 
settlor mindset, argued that the Hawaiian experience was one of many different experiences that deserve attention: “ [I]f we are 
going to include the Hawaiian culture, why not include the cultures of all of the immigrant peoples of this State because I think 
they have a right to have a place in the history of this State.” Id. at 519. 
 111   Id. at 518. 
 112   GEORGE S. KANAHELE, HAWAIIAN RENAISSANCE 13 (1982). 
 113   See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 at 
372–73 (1987). Hawai‘i’s 1978 constitutional convention is best known for progressive changes with respect to environmental 
protection, Hawaiian rights, and judicial independence. 
 114   See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that segregated public schools were 
“inherently unequal”); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON 
THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, at xi–xiii (1987); Anne F. Boxberger Flaherty, American Indian 
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DOCUMENT COLLECTION VOL. I 75, 75 (Scott H. Ainsworth & Brian M. Harward, eds. 2019) (describing the American Indian 
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AND THE NEW LEFT 24–27 (1979); JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN 
EMERGING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 12–15 (1975); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND Law 1–2 (1987); Ian F. Haney López, Protest, Repression, and Race: Legal 
Violence and the Chicano Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 205-09, 243-44 (2001); F. ARTURO ROSALES, CHICANO!: THE HISTORY OF 
THE MEXICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT xviii, 180 (2d ed. 1997); JUAN GÓMEZ-QUIÑONES, CHICANO POLITICS: 
REALITY AND PROMISE, 1940-1990 141 (1990). 
 115   See SMITH, supra note 70, at 113; LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANGE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: 
THE DRAFT, THE WAR AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 62–63 (1978); CHARLES DEBENEDETTI & CHARLES CHATFIELD, 
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contest the master narrative. This move was a critical piece of the success of 1978. As Yamamoto 
articulates, “[s]ocial understandings of historical injustice are largely constructed in the present. Those 
understandings are rooted less in backward-looking searches for ‘what happened’ than in the present-
day dynamics of collective memory.”116 
The starting point for understanding the context of the landmark changes in 1978 and the 
shifting collective memory supporting Native Hawaiians is seeing how collective memory exists 
within the “terrain of culture.”117 This cultural terrain includes media-driven popular cultural images 
and cultural practices, such as language revitalization, artistic expression, and the institutions and 
political environment in which decisions are made.118 
1. Reviving Hawaiian Culture and Identity 
The reclamation of Hawaiian identity and a developing interest in the Hawaiian language, 
Hawaiian arts, and culture amongst Kānaka Maoli and their allies reframed the cultural terrain in 
Hawai‘i. Indeed, despite the near collapse of the Native Hawaiian culture following the American 
theft of sovereignty from the Hawaiian people and the Americanization project,119 glimmers of 
resistance within Kānaka Maoli remained. Individuals like Mary Kawena Puku‘i, Papa Auwae, and 
‘Iolani Luahine held steadfast to their stories and traditions.120 They refused to let their identities and 
those of their ancestors vanish. In 1964, a book by John Dominis Holt spurred a renewed interest in 
regaining a Hawaiian identity.121 In On Being Hawaiian, Holt demanded justice: “[W]e want to run our 
own show—at long last—as an ethnic and political conglomerate on our own terms.”122 He noted 
how Hawaiians’ self-respect was “undermined by carping criticism of ‘Hawaiian beliefs’ and 
stereotypes concerning our being lazy, laughing, lovable children who needed to be looked after by 
more ‘realistic’ adult oriented caretakers. . . .”123 
During this time, Native Hawaiians finally learned about Hawai‘i’s past, which the Territorial 
government had suppressed during the Americanization project.124 Indeed, the University of Hawai‘i 
 
STAUGHTON LYND, THE RESISTANCE 3-4 (1971). 
 116   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1757. 
 117   Id. at 1765. 
 118   Id. 
 119   See ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i, KA PUUHONUA O NA HAWAII, Jan. 26, 1917, at 1 (decrying the state of the Hawaiian language: 
“Aole keiki o 15 makahiki e hiki ke kamailio pololei i ka olelo makuahine o keia aina,” which translates as “there is no child 
under 15 years of age who can converse correctly in the mother tongue of this land”). Schools indoctrinated children with a 
sanitized and western view of Hawaiian political history. See Troy J.H. Andrade, E Ola Ka ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i: Protecting the Hawaiian 
Language and Providing Equality for Kānaka Maoli, 6 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ J. L., CULTURE, & RESISTANCE 3, 23 (2020) 
[hereinafter E Ola Ka ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i]. 
 120   See Troy J.H. Andrade, Changing Tides: A Political and Legal History of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 16-17 (May 
2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa). 
 121   See JOHN DOMINIS HOLT, ON BEING HAWAIIAN (1995). 
 122   Id. at 8; see also ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra note 97, at 294 (noting that Holt’s pride in Hawaiian identity was 
shared by young people and traditional Hawaiian organizations). 
 123   See HOLT, supra note 121, at 7-8. 
 124   See (Re)Righting History, supra note 17, at 681-82 (discussing Kuykendall’s narrative of Hawaiian history written at the 
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established a Hawaiian Studies Program to assist in preserving, studying, and elaborating on the 
Hawaiian culture and community.125 Importantly, and despite territorial laws and practices that in 
essence forbade the use of Hawaiian language in schools,126 Kānaka Maoli regained use of and 
appreciation for ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i, the Hawaiian language, which experts considered a “dying” language.127 
At the University of Hawai‘i, one language teacher increased to more than a dozen. 128 Private and 
public high schools began teaching Hawaiian language courses. 129 In 1972, the ‘Ahahui ‘Ōlelo 
Hawai‘i conducted a weekly talk show on the radio entirely in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i.130 This reclaiming of 
language allowed for greater connection to Native Hawaiian culture and identity. As Ngũgĩ wa 
Thiong’o describes: 
Language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature and 
literature, the entire body of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and 
our place in the world. How people perceive themselves affects how they look at 
their culture, at their politics and at the social production of wealth, at their entire 
relationship to nature and to other beings. Language is thus inseparable from 
ourselves as a community of human beings with a specific form and character, a 
specific history, a specific relationship to the world.131 
With a flourishing language came an interest in other traditional arts, powerful sites of self-
representation and indigenous articulation that also resist colonization. Linda Tuhiwai Smith 
emphasizes how creating art, literature, or ideas “transcend[s] the basic survival mode” and 
contributes to “the spirit of creating which indigenous communities have exercised over thousands of 
years.”132 In her analysis of indigenous modes of knowing and being, Smith elucidates the politically 
generative function of cultural production: “Imagination enables people to rise above their own 
circumstances, to dream new visions and to hold on to old ones.”133 In 1970s Hawai‘i, for example, 
the traditional form of hula, dance, found its revival.134 Once described by a Christian bishop as an 
“unnamable lewdness” and a cause of Native Hawaiians’ rapid decline,135 traditional hula was no 
longer an expression hidden from the public eye. Dissatisfied with the commodification of the hula, 
 
request of the Historical Commission of the Territory of Hawai‘i). 
 125   See Helen Altonn, UH to Offer Hawaiian Studies, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Oct. 3, 1977, at A-18. 
 126   See E Ola Ka ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i, supra note 119, at 21. 
 127   See id.; see also Richard R. Day, The Ultimate Inequality: Linguistic Genocide, in LANGUAGE OF INEQUALITY 163, 170 
(Joan Manes & Nessa Wolfson eds., 2012). 
 128   KANAHELE, supra note 112, at 18. 
 129   Id. 
 130   KANAHELE, supra note 112, at 17-18. 
 131   See THIONG’O, supra note 108, at 16. 
 132   See SMITH, supra note 70, at 158. 
 133   Id. 
 134   KANAHELE, supra note 112, at 15. 
 135   S.E. BISHOP, WHY ARE THE HAWAIIANS DYING OUT? OR, ELEMENTS OF DISABILITY FOR SURVIVAL AMONG 
THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE 14 (1888). 
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traditional practitioners Joseph K. Ilalaole, Pua Ha‘aheo, Lokalia Montgomery, ‘Iolani Luahine, Kaui 
Zuttermeister, and Edith Kanaka‘ole trained students, who in turn became kumu hula, master teachers, 
training scores of young people.136 
In 1971, the Hawaiian Music Foundation was established to perpetuate Hawaiian music.137 
The Foundation sponsored slack key, steel guitar, and falsetto contests.138 Talented Kānaka Maoli 
musicians such as the Cazimero Brothers, Gabby Pahinui, Olomana, and the Sons of Hawai‘i singing 
songs in the Hawaiian language were as familiar to Hawai‘i’s multicultural populace as nationally 
recognized musicians.139 Eddie Kamae, famous entertainer and member of the Sons of Hawai‘i, 
stated, “Young Hawaiian musicians are coming out of the woodwork in droves.”140 These artists 
revived old songs and created new ones that reflected the cultural and political changes occurring in 
Hawai‘i at the time.141 The lyrics to the song, Hawai‘i ‘78, written by high school student Mickey 
Ioane, captured the haunting sentiment of the era and became an anthem for Native Hawaiian 
political resistance: 
If just for a day our king and queen 
Would visit all these islands and saw everything, 
How would they feel about the changes of our land? 
Could you just imagine if they were around 
And saw highways on their sacred grounds? 
How would they feel about this modern city life? 
Tears would come from each others’ eyes 
As they would stop to realize 
That our people are in great, great danger now. 
 
How, would they feel, could their smiles be content, then cry? 
Cry for the gods, cry for the people 
Cry for the land that was taken away 
And then yet you’ll find, Hawai‘i. 
Could you just imagine if they came back 
And saw traffic lights and railroad tracks? 
How would they feel about this modern city life? 
 
 136   KANAHELE, supra note 112, at 14. 
 137   Id. 
 138   Id. 
 139   Id. at 13-14. 
 140   Id. 
 141   Mele, songs, have always served an important site of resistance for Native Hawaiians. See, e.g., American Overthrow, 
supra note 2, at 12-13 (discussing the song Kaulana Nā Pua as a song of resistance to the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of 
Hawai‘i). 
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Tears would come from each others’ eyes 
As they would stop to realize 
That our land is in great, great danger now. 
All the fighting that the king had done 
To conquer all these islands now these condominiums 
How would he feel if he saw Hawai‘i nei? 
How, would he feel, would his smile be content, then cry?142 
The sound of this Hawaiian Renaissance reflected a cultural and spiritual reawakening of, for, and by 
Native Hawaiians. 
But the quintessential symbol of Kānaka Maoli cultural revival in the 1970s was the 
successful transpacific voyage of the Hōkūle‘a, a traditionally designed double hull canoe.143 The 
Polynesian Voyaging Society, under the vigilant eye of master navigators Mau Piailug and Nainoa 
Thompson, and cultural consultant Herb Kane, revived the all-but-lost ancient navigational arts and 
skills.144 Reaching its destination of Tahiti from Hawai‘i in 1976 without the use of modern 
navigational equipment seemed to be an unprecedented feat.145 According to Kane, “[t]he building of 
the canoe and its trip are stimulating a cultural revival where Hawaiians are learning what their 
ancestors were capable of accomplishing. The voyage has confirmed Polynesian intelligence, 
resourcefulness and self-esteem.”146 The Hōkūle‘a thus symbolized Native Hawaiian pride because it 
showed their intellectual prowess in the past and the twentieth century. 
This was the “Hawaiian Renaissance,” which encompassed “a revival of interest in the past, 
in the pursuit of knowledge or learning, and in the future. In short, it deal[t] with the revitalization of 
the human spirit in all aspects of endeavor.”147 
2. Political Mobilization 
Alongside the surge in cultural awareness, Kānaka Maoli began to organize and find their 
political voice. Three community organizations—The Hawaiians, the Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian 
 
 142   Hawai‘i ‘78, MANA MELE, https://www.manamele.org/hawaii-78 [https://perma.cc/F4DU-BGC7] (last visited 
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 144   The Story of Hōkūle‘a, POLYNESIAN VOYAGING SOCIETY, http://www.hokulea.com/voyages/our-story/ 
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 146   Quoted in Bunky Bakutis, Bigger Excitement to Come After Return Voyage, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 5, 1976, 
at A-4. 
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Ancestry, and the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana—mobilized during the 1970s to bring the struggles of 
Hawai‘i’s indigenous people to the fore of public consciousness. These mass mobilizations provoked 
media attention to the injustices facing Native Hawaiians and created opportunities to educate 
Hawaiians and allies. These efforts also reframed justice struggles for Hawaiians by highlighting the 
failures of both the state and federal governments. 
a. The Hawaiians 
“The Hawaiians” were pioneers of this political mobilization.148 In the predominantly 
Kānaka Maoli community of Waimānalo, a young Raymond Pae Galdeira drew public attention to the 
issue of Hawaiian economic justice.149 Galdeira grew up on leased lands in Waimānalo awarded to his 
mother pursuant to the 1921 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act.150 This federal legislation provided 
land to “any descendent of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the 
Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778.”151 Galdeira wanted to give back to his community and founded 
the Waimānalo Teen Project to keep local teens active and out of trouble after school and on 
weekends.152 
One stormy night, a few teenagers asked if Galdeira could give them a ride home.153 
Galdeira agreed, but, to his shock, the teens directed him to Waimānalo Beach Park, which had 
grown to become a sort of “tent city” of Kānaka Maoli.154 With the winds gusting and the spray of 
ocean water and rain pelting their skin, Galdeira and the teens jumped out of the car and assisted a 
mother who, while holding and trying to protect her newborn, was struggling to keep the tarp 
covering her family’s home from blowing away.155 Galdeira was beside himself when he saw these 
Native Hawaiian teens and their families struggling to keep their tents from collapsing: “why were 
Hawaiian families living at the beach and not in a home on Hawaiian homestead land?”156 He made a 
phone call to the local paper to shed light on a situation that many were talking about, but about 
which no one was willing to take any action.157 Galdeira spoke with his mother-in-law, Elizabeth K. 
Tuttle, a volunteer with the Legal Aid Society, about the situation.158 Tuttle told Galdeira that she had 
been researching the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the state and federal governments’ 
 
 148   See generally, Davianna McGregor-Alegado, Hawaiians: Organizing in the 1970s, 7 AMERASIA J. 29, 29-51 (1980). 
 149   Interview with Raymond Pae Galdeira, Founder, The Hawaiians, in Henderson, Nev. (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter 
Galdeira Interview]. 
 150   Id. 
 151   Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921) (defining “native Hawaiian” as “any 
descendent of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778”). 
 152   See Galdeira Interview, supra note 149. 
 153   Id. 
 154   Id. 
 155   Id. 
 156   Id. 
 157   Id. 
 158   Id. 
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failures to uphold their obligations to native Hawaiians.159 Armed with new knowledge of the past, 
Galdeira reclaimed that history and put out a call that revived Hawaiian consciousness on the 
historical injustices and the need to correct them. In other words, Galdeira organized.160 
With the support of other Waimānalo residents and his wife, Luana, Galdeira invited Native 
Hawaiians from all over the state to Waimānalo to meet with the Legal Aid Society and discuss issues 
concerning the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands.161 
Those at the gathering discussed leasing policies and allegations of nepotism and favoritism in the 
lease awarding process.162 They also decided to call themselves, simply, The Hawaiians.163 Their goal 
was to “gain ‘justice’ for the Hawaiians, to improve their social and economic position, and to restore 
racial pride.”164 Their first objective was to meet with Governor John A. Burns and list their 
grievances with the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands.165 
On October 13, 1970, Galdeira sent a letter to Governor Burns advising him that The 
Hawaiians would hold a rally at the State Capitol rotunda on October 25, 1970, to “demonstrate that 
we Hawaiians are united in our drive to get more land through the Hawaiian Homes Act and to help 
encourage our people to participate and strengthen our cause.”166 After persistent calls to the 
Governor for a meeting and a promise that The Hawaiians would picket the Governor’s office, 
Galdeira led a demonstration at the Capitol during one of the busiest tourist events of the year, Aloha 
Week.167 Hundreds of demonstrators—Hawaiians and many more non-Hawaiians—showed up from 
around the state.168 As promised, they demanded a meeting with Governor Burns.169 Embarrassed by 
the demonstration occurring during such a highly publicized tourist event, Governor Burns 
begrudgingly granted the meeting, but not before a heated exchange with Galdeira:170 
Finally [Governor Burns] came over to me and he said, “What the fock you 
doing?” So I look at him. 
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At first I had respect because he was the Governor – but I said, “Hey, fock you 
man, because we trying to reach you and you were giving us this kind of run 
around.” 
He said, “Bullshit,” you know, and he was going in a rage. Yeah, he was really high. 
So we went at it for about five minutes, and finally he said, “Okay, I want to meet 
with you at two o’clock.”171 
Governor Burns and his special assistant, Myron Pinky Thompson, fielded questions and 
provided assurances that the Burns Administration would do everything in their power to address the 
dilapidating Department of Hawaiian Home Lands.172 This meeting was the first of numerous open 
discussions the Governor had with The Hawaiians about their issues with the Department of 
Hawaiian Home Lands.173 It eventually led to Burns requesting that The Hawaiians submit names of 
candidates to fill the upcoming vacancies on the Commission.174 Galdeira later remarked: “I see a lot 
of hope for Hawaiian people in the future, simply because they know what’s happening and they 
won’t run away from their problems. We have to go political – that’s the only way things can 
happen.”175 
Galdeira and The Hawaiians assisted other Native Hawaiians in their struggles to keep land. 
In 1974, The Hawaiians staged an occupation on Hawai‘i Island to assist rancher Sonny Kaniho after 
the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands denied Kaniho homesteading lands despite thousands of 
acres being leased to the large privately owned Parker Ranch.176 The Hawaiians assisted Ka ̄naka Maoli 
and other farmers in Kalama Valley on O‘ahu, who faced eviction because of proposed 
 
 171   TOM COFFMAN, TEN YEARS OF COMMUNITY ACTION 18–19 (1975). 
 172   See Galdeira Interview, supra note 149; Letter from John A. Burns, Governor of Hawai‘i to Raymond Pae Galdeira, 
Chairman, The Hawaiians, at 4 (Oct. 25, 1970) (on file with author, retrieved from the Hawai‘i State Archives) (“I would like to 
see every qualified applicant off the list and on a homestead. I would like to see the Commission and the department actively 
supporting our Hawaiian people in search for solutions to all their problems, not just housing. I would like to see these 
programs become a valuable tool in the revitalization of the Hawaiian culture and an increase of appreciation of what it means 
to be Hawaiian by Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians alike.”). 
 173   Galdeira Interview, supra note 149. 
 174   Id. 
 175   James Bassett, The Hawaiians Make Bid for their Share, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 20, 1971, at C-3. The 
Hawaiians would tackle several other issues to assist the struggling communities in Hawai‘i, including organizing the People’s 
Market. See Galdeira Interview, supra note 149. The People’s Market was a bold initiative in economic and agricultural self-
sufficiency because it assisted farmers in supplying produce directly to consumers, thereby bypassing retail sales. Id.; see also 
McGregor-Alegado, supra note 149, at 44. This open market idea allowed farmers to reap more of the profit for their families 
and pass on lower costs to the consumer. Through his work with the Legal Aid Society, Galdeira was also pivotal in the 
establishment of the Community Client Counseling Program and the Hawaiian Coalition for Native Claims. See Galdeira 
Interview, supra note 149. The Hawaiian Coalition for Native Claims later became the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, a 
legal advocacy group that actively fights to protect Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights and interests. Id. But, by 
far, The Hawaiians’ most significant contribution came with demanding reform of the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands. 
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development.177 The Hawaiians and Kalama Valley farmers were “natural allies” because “The 
Hawaiians pointed to the failure of the homestead program, while tenants in Kalama were living 
proof of that failure. It was public knowledge that several families in the Valley had been on the 
Hawaiian Homes waiting list for decades.”178 
Although the Kalama Valley residents failed to save their homes and way of living, the 
efforts of The Hawaiians eventually led to the appointment of one of their own, Georgiana Padeken, 
as director of the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands.179 This was a turning point in the 
Department’s history. Through lobbying, advocacy, mass protests, and non-violent civil disobedience, 
The Hawaiians successfully influenced reforms to the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, and 
awakened Ka ̄naka Maoli to the possibilities of a unified voice of resistance.180 
b. Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian Ancestry 
Another entity, the Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian Ancestry (“ALOHA”), sought reparations 
from the federal government for the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.181 Louisa K. Rice 
founded ALOHA in 1972, inspired by Queen Lili‘uokalani’s autobiography, Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s 
Queen.182 In the book, Lili‘uokalani describes her life story and key events during and after the 
overthrow, including her effort to reclaim the throne.183 The 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act, which provided Alaska Natives with title to approximately forty million acres of land and a 
nearly one billion dollar cash settlement in exchange for their extinguishment of all claims against the 
government and the revocation of any existing Native reserves,184 influenced ALOHA’s push for 
reparations.185 Along these lines, ALOHA’s president, Charles Maxwell, articulated the organization’s 
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coordinated efforts to support each other and bring about necessary reforms). 
 181   MICHAEL K. DUDLEY & KEONI K. AGARD, A HAWAIIAN NATION II: A CALL FOR HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
109 (1990). 
 182   Id.; see Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act: Hearings on H.R. 1944 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Aff. of the 
H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Aff., 94th Cong, 28 (1975) (statement of Charles Maxwell, President, ALOHA) (“[T]he 
ALOHA Association . . . was founded in 1972 by Louisa K. Rice. . . . First there were only a handful of members . . . who 
joined, because the Hawaiian natives felt that the United States of America is such a powerful Government and they would not 
listen to the native Hawaiians, who claimed their kingdom was lost over 80 years ago.”). 
 183   QUEEN LILI‘UOKALANI, HAWAII’S STORY BY HAWAII’S QUEEN (Univ. of Hawai‘i Press, 2013) (1898). 
 184   Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629h. (1971); see also Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L.J. 1331, 1331 (1992) (confirming the calculations 
of money and land provided in the settlement). 
 185   DUDLEY & AGARD, supra note 181, at 109; see also Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act: Hearings on H.R. 1944 
Before the Subcomm. on Indian Aff. of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Aff., 94th Cong, 28 (1975) (statement of 
Charles Maxwell, President, ALOHA) (“The native Hawaiians were made aware of the Alaska Native Claims Bill and that the 
Alaskan natives were successful in their claims. The membership and interest in the ALOHA Association began to increase and 
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goals: “The mission of ALOHA is to get legislation to justly and fairly compensate the Hawaiian 
natives for what the United States of America took from them.”186 
In a sign of its growing presence, in 1973 ALOHA organized a telethon that raised 
$150,000.187 A year later, ALOHA submitted a bill through Hawai‘i’s congressional representatives 
Patsy T. Mink and Spark M. Matsunaga demanding one billion dollars in settlement for claims 
stemming from the United States’ involvement in the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.188 
The bill condemned the “lawless, fraudulent and forceful acts of agents of the United States” in the 
1893 overthrow189 and sought to create a “Hawaiian Native Corporation” that would receive and 
administer the one billion dollar settlement funds.190 It would also require the Secretary of the Interior 
to prepare and maintain a roll of Native Hawaiians.191 Public hearings were eventually held on 
ALOHA’s reparations bill, but passage proved elusive.192 The resolution died in the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.193 
c. Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana 
While ALOHA sought to hold the federal government accountable for reparations, other 
activists demanded de-militarization of the islands. Their first demand was for the United States Navy 
to halt the aerial and surface bombardment of live and inert ordnances on the forty-five square mile 
 
the native Hawaiians started to investigate the bases of the claim, which they found to be true. . . .”). 
 186   Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act: Hearings on H.R. 1944 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Aff. of the H. 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Aff., 94th Cong, 28 (1975) (statement of Charles Maxwell, President, ALOHA). 
 187   See McGregor-Alegado, supra note 148, at 45; DUDLEY & AGARD, supra note 181, at 109. 
 188   Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act: Hearings on H.R. 1944 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Aff. of the H. 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Aff., 94th Cong, 19 (1975) (statement of Spark Matsunaga, Representative for the State of 
Hawai‘i , U.S. Congress) (stating the bill “bears the names of Congresswoman Mink and myself as consponsors of the measure 
but the bill belongs in a larger sense to the ALOHA Association, whose members worked so hard to develop the legislation in 
the first place . . . “) 
 189   H.R. 15666, 93rd Cong. (1974). 
 190   Id.; see also Viveca Novak, Hawai‘i’s Dirty Secret: The Continuing Denial of Native Hawaiian Land Rights, in ISLANDS IN 
CAPTIVITY: THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS HAWAIIANS 198 (Ward Churchill & Sharon 
Venne, eds., 2004) [hereinafter ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY]. 
 191   H.R. 15666, 93rd Cong. (1974). 
 192   Due to the efforts of ALOHA and Hawai‘i’s congressional delegation, particularly United States Senator Daniel K. 
Inouye, Congress eventually passed a law that established a “Native Hawaiians Study Commission” to make a recommendation 
as to whether the federal government should provide reparations for the Hawaiian community. Native Hawaiians Study 
Commission Act, Pub. L No. 96-565, § 301-302, 94 Stat. 3324 (1980) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 2991a notes). Inouye, a highly 
decorated war hero, had a fair understanding of the federal government’s involvement in the overthrow of the Kingdom of 
Hawai‘i, and spearheaded the effort to establish the Commission to address the needs and concerns of the Hawaiian people—a 
people for whom Inouye had much respect. Indeed, Inouye’s first act as a legislator in the territorial government was to 
propose vacating the Legislature out of ‘Iolani Palace, the home of the last Hawaiian monarchs, even if it means “going into a 
tent” because it was “sacrilege” to hold meetings in the Queen’s throne room. See ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra note 97, at 
299. 
 193   See Novak, supra note 190, at 198; H.R. 15666. 
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island of Kaho‘olawe.194 Protests against the bombing ensued after continued safety concerns and an 
unexploded bomb was found on property owned by Maui Mayor Elmer Carvalho in 1969.195 Mayor 
Carvalho, with the organization Life of the Land, filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the 
government for failure to file a legally required environmental impact statement.196 The district court 
dismissed the lawsuit after the federal government hurriedly put together the impact statement in 
1972, and the United States Army resumed bombarding the sacred island with heavy artillery.197 
Equipped with the phrase “E hō mai i nā lima eia hoi he hana ka kākou” (“allow the hands 
to come forth for here is work to be done”), members of the Protect Kaho‘olawe Association, later 
named the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana (“PKO”), no longer sat idle as another culturally significant 
site was demolished at the hands of the American government.198 Inspired by the 1971 Native 
American occupation of Alcatraz Island and the occupation at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge 
Indian Reservation in South Dakota, the PKO began a series of landings on and occupations of 
Kaho‘olawe.199 
On January 4, 1976, nine individuals made the first landing.200 Within hours of landfall, the 
United States Coast Guard detained seven of the nine members.201 Dr. Emmett Aluli, an extern 
practicing rural medicine on Moloka‘i, and Walter Ritte, Jr., a former high school and college 
basketball standout, hid in the thickets of a kiawe tree.202 With Marine helicopters zooming overhead, 
 
 194   Kaho‘olawe, also known as Kohe mālamalama o Kanaloa, was a place of spiritual and cultural significance to the 
Kānaka Maoli. It served as the stronghold for the priesthood that worshiped Kanaloa, one of the four principle gods in the 
Hawaiian cosmology. Ancient people lived there in communities along the coastline. The island served as an important training 
center for budding navigators. See Noa Emmett Aluli, The Most Shot-at Island in the Pacific, in ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY, supra note 
190, at 238-39. On February 20, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10436, which seized 
Kaho‘olawe because it “appear[ed] necessary and in the public interest that the Island . . . be taken and reserved for the use of 
the United States for naval purposes . . . .” Exec. Order No. 10436, 18 Fed. Reg. 1,051 (Feb. 20, 1953). The island was 
thereafter placed under the Navy’s jurisdiction. Id. Bombing of Kaho‘olawe began in 1940, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor. See Peter MacDonald, Fixed in Time: A Brief History of Kahoolawe, 6 HAWAIIAN J. HIST. 69, 76, 86 (1972). 
 195   See MacDonald, supra note 194, at 78-79. 
 196   See id. at 85-86. 
 197   Id. 
 198   WALTER RITTE JR. & RICHARD SAWYER, NA MANAO ALOHA O KAHOOLAWE 4 (1978). 
 199   Colleen Uechi, Stepping on to Kahoolawe, Stepping into History, THE MAUI NEWS, Jan. 5. 2016, 
https://www.mauinews.com/news/local-news/2016/01/stepping-on-to-kahoolawe-stepping-into-history/ [https://perma.cc/
W548-7UQV]; see also RITTE & SAWYER, supra note 198, at 3 (describing PKO’s goals as threefold: “(1) [t]o ensure through 
Aloha ‘Āina, the proper use of Hawai‘i’s natural resources (her peoples, her lands, her waters, and all which comes so willingly 
from the ‘āina); (2) [t]o perpetuate the historical, cultural, spiritual and social significance of Kaho‘olawe; and (3) [t]o instill a 
strong sense of pride in ho‘oHawai‘i (being and acting Hawai‘i) through knowledge and practice”). 
 200   David Tong, Two Still on Kahoolawe, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 6, 1976, at A-3. 
 201   Id. The Coast Guard arrested George Helm, Kimo Aluli, Gail Prejean, Steve Morse, Ellen Miles, Karla Villalba 
(published in error as Carla), and Ian Lind. Id. 
 202   See PBS Hawai‘i, Long Story Short, Interview: Noa Emmett Aluli (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.pbshawaii.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/LSS_1229_Noa_Emmett_Aluli_Web_Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXF9-924B]; Mark 
Coleman, Walter Ritte, Honolulu Star-Advertiser (April 5, 2013), https://www.staradvertiser.com/2013/04/05/editorial/name-
in-the-news/walter-ritte/ [https://perma.cc/ZGK9-XJ85]. 
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both Ritte and Aluli held out for three days before turning themselves over to the federal 
government.203 Those three days transformed Ritte and Aluli and motivated them to complete the 
landings.204 
On January 12, 1976, Ritte, his wife Loretta, and his sister Scarlett, joined Dr. Aluli for a 
second landing.205 The Rittes spent five days on the island before the government detained them.206 
Ritte and Aluli also faced federal criminal charges for trespassing on federal military property.207 
In a change in strategy, PKO leader George Jarrett Helm, Jr. wrote to the Navy requesting 
access to Kaho‘olawe to perform religious healing ceremonies to cleanse the island of its “evil” and to 
symbolically accept responsibility of stewardship.208 To the PKO’s surprise, the Navy allowed the 
third landing. Although federal authorities denied Ritte permission to land on the island, on February 
13, 1976, approximately sixty people, including Ritte, participated in a third occupation.209 Among the 
participants in this third landing were several kūpuna, elders, including revered cultural practitioners 
Sam Lono and Emma DeFries, who participated in the ceremonies of mōhai aloha, love offering, and 
ho’okupu, gift-giving.210 
Helm was the political and spiritual leader of the PKO.211 He attracted support from 
Hawaiians long dissociated with the efforts to reconcile historical injustices.212 He used his knowledge 
of political history and his alluring falsetto voice to convince people across the state of the 
importance of stopping the bombing of Kaho‘olawe. 213 The Protect PKO was highly successful in 
garnering public support, and by January 1977, two-thirds of Hawai‘i’s population wanted the 
bombing stopped and the island returned to the people of Hawai‘i.214 The State’s Historic 
Preservation Office conducted an archaeological survey of the island and uncovered twenty-nine sites 
deemed eligible for the National Register of Historic Places.215 Yet the bombing continued.216 
 
 
 203   See Uechi, supra note 199, at 3. 
 204   Id. 
 205   Edwin Tanji & Karen Horton, A “Crowd” on Kahoolawe?, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 14, 1976, at A-3. 
 206   Terry McMurray, Ritte Jailed by FBI, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Jan. 18, 1976, at A-1, A-4. 
 207   Aluli Charged with Trespass After Kahoolawe Warning, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 19, 1976, at 34. 
 208   Bob McCabe, The Gods are Appeased, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 14, 1976, at A-1, A-7. 
 209   Id. 
 210   Id. at A-7 (“The special religious rites, considered an essential step in the struggle to wrest the Island from military 
control, were performed by kahuna Sam Lono of Honolulu, who invoked the ancient god of old Hawaii to return to the Island. 
Lono, assisted by Emma Defries, who is also considered an important Hawaiian spiritualist, changed ancient Hawaiian prayers 
and officiated over the preparation of a ritual drink made from the scared [sic] awa root.”). 
 211   See Rodney Morales, George Helm: The Voice and Soul, in HO‘IHO‘I HOU: A TRIBUTE TO GEORGE HELM AND KIMO 
MITCHELL 22–23 (Rodney Morales, ed. 1984) [hereinafter HO‘IHO‘I HOU]. 
 212   Id. at 22. 
 213   See id. (describing how at times Helm convinced others the importance of PKO’s work through songs and 
speeches). 
 214   Id. at 23. 
 215   Id. 
 216   Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,




Eleven months after the third landing, on January 30, 1977, members of the PKO 
proceeded with their fourth landing.217 Ritte and PKO-leader Helm joined Richard Sawyer, Charles 
Warrington, Jr., and Francis Kauhane, a law student who had earlier protested alongside Pae Galdeira 
and Sonny Kaniho on Hawai‘i Island.218 Helm reflected on the rationale for the fourth landing: “Call 
me a radical for I refuse to remain idle. I will not have the foreigner prostitute the soul of my being, 
and I will not make a whore out of my soul (my culture).”219 Helm described the occupation of the 
military installation as “not so much a defiance as it is a responsibility to express our legitimate 
concern for the land of the Hawaiian. . . . We are against warfare but more so against imperialism.”220 
Helm, Kauhane, and Warrington hiked for a day across the island and then turned themselves over to 
the Coast Guard.221 Ritte and Sawyer planned to stay on Kaho‘olawe indefinitely. 
Helm returned to Honolulu and, because the bombing continued, decided to change his 
strategy and work within the political system.222 Helm and other members of the PKO met with 
legislators and used local media to their advantage.223 Nevertheless, the Navy still refused to 
acknowledge Ritte’s and Sawyer’s presence on the island.224 
On February 10, 1977, Helm led a delegation of the PKO to the State Capitol for a rally.225 
The next day, in an unprecedented move, state Representatives Henry Ha‘alilio Peters and Jan Yuen 
convinced their colleagues to allow Helm to address the Legislature.226 Helm pleaded to legislators: 
We are motivated to pursue the action of protecting whatever is left of our culture 
and very basically, it is simple. The culture exists only if the life of the land is 
perpetuated in righteousness; that belongs to my ancestors. You folks are using this 
to get paid, to build your homes, to give your kids an education, to bring kids over 
here and listen to you give a political rhetoric. I came here to ask; to help some 
people’s lives. . . . Please kokua [help]; do something—some reaction. Every county 
made a resolution . . . Bills have been passed and when something like this is 
 
 217   See Keith Haugen, Kahoolawe Concerns Cited: 5 Men’s Trip Described as “Necessary”, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 
1, 1977, at 5; Rodney Morales, George Helm: The Voice and Soul, in HO’IHO’I HOU, supra note 211, at 23. 
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1977, at 5. 
 219   George Helm, Personal Statement: Reasons for Fourth Occupation of Kahoolawe, in HO‘IHO‘I HOU, supra note 211, at 55. 
 220   George Helm, George’s Diary: Fourth Occupation of Kaho’olawe, Jan. 1977, in HO‘IHO‘I HOU, supra note 211, at 72. 
 221   Rodney Morales, George Helm: The Voice and Soul, in HO‘IHO‘I HOU, supra note 211, at 23–24. 
 222   Id. at 24. 
 223   Id. 
 224   Id. 
 225   Id. Helm also took advantage of the media by joining radio talk shows. Id. (calling out politicians on the most 
popular radio show: “When I walk down to Kohala, and I walk house to house in Hana, and I walk house to house in Molokai, 
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politicians. They’re using statistics to define the problems and they ain’t gonna know the problem until they sit down and look 
[the people] in the eye. . . . it takes a lot of stripping away”). 
 226   Greg Kakesako, House Backed into Support of Kahoolawe, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 12, 1977, at 2 (“After the 
[House] resolution, which also demanded the Navy to start cleaning up the tiny target Island, was adopted, Helm was allowed 
to address the legislators.”). 
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happening, nothing is being done. All I’m asking for is a reaction, positive or 
negative, but please support us if you can, and we are talking about Aloha ‘Aina 
‘Ohana and if you cannot understand it, go do your homework.227 
The legislators quickly introduced and passed a resolution to stop the bombing.228 That 
same day, federal Judge Samuel W. King denied two temporary restraining orders that sought to halt 
the bombing.229 But Helm would not relent. 
Helm and Kauhane, along with members of the newly established Council of Hawaiian 
Organizations, traveled to Washington, D.C., to appeal to President Jimmy Carter and Hawai‘i’s 
congressional delegation.230 Unfortunately, Carter was vacationing in Georgia and most of Hawai‘i’s 
congressional delegation had returned to Hawai‘i to meet with the Navy and tour Kaho‘olawe.231 The 
Navy conducted the delegation’s tour in the worst areas of the island to attempt to illustrate that the 
soil was useless.232 The tour also included a demonstration in which “F4 jets dropped 27 Mark 76’s—
dummy bombs with an explosive device the size of a 12-gauge shotgun shell rather than the usual live 
500-pound bombs.”233 After being handed enlarged photos of the naval commanders, the delegation 
apparently left satisfied with the Navy’s conduct.234 One reporter characterized the delegation’s tour 
as “Kahoolawe Whitewash.”235 
When Helm returned to Hawai‘i, signs pointed toward a cataclysmic event: Helm had a 
dream that Ritte and Sawyer were in danger and needed help; kahuna (spiritualist) Morrnah Simeona 
told Helm that a large wave would wash over Kaho‘olawe and that he needed to rescue Ritte and 
Sawyer; kahuna Emma DeFries foretold of an upheaval and warned Helm against going.236 Helm 
nevertheless decided to rescue his companions.237 
 
 227   George Helm, Speech to the State House, in HO‘IHO‘I HOU, supra note 211, at 69-70. The concept of “aloha ‘āina” 
embodies a reciprocal and unconditional love for the land and the sovereignty of Hawai‘i. It is a concept that evokes patriotism 
for Hawai‘i and its people. 
 228   See House Resolution Requesting a Solution to the Problems of Kaho‘olawe, H.R. 321, 9th Leg. (Haw. 1977) 
(requesting the Navy to halt the bombing of Kaho‘olawe and restore the island to a safe condition); Observing the Navy’s 
Violation of Executive Order 11593 and Requesting Congress to Halt the Bombing of Kaho‘olawe, H.C.R. 80, 9th Leg. (Haw. 
1977) (requesting that Congress halt the bombing and conduct an archaeological survey); Senate Resolution Requesting a 
Solution to the Problems of Kaho‘olawe, S.R. 392, 9th Leg. (Haw. 1977) (demanding the Defense Department comply with 
President Jimmy Carter’s request for a feasibility study on using non-explosive ordnances). 
 229   Keith Haugen, Court Denies Request to Halt Kahoolawe Bombing, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 11, 1977, at 2. 
 230   See Rodney Morales, George Helm: The Voice and Soul, in HO‘IHO‘I HOU, supra note 211, at 25 (discussing the visit of 
Helm and Kauhane to Washington, D.C.); Kahoolawe Protestors Meet 3 Carter Aides, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN, Feb. 15, 1977 at 
A-1 (discussing three members of the Council of Hawaiian Organizations to advocate to President Carter and Hawiian 
Congressional delegates). 
 231   Rodney Morales, George Helm: The Voice and Soul, in HO‘IHO‘I HOU, supra note 211, at 25. 
 232   Pam Smith, Operation Whitewash, HAWAII OBSERVER, March 10, 1977, at 6–7 [hereinafter Operation Whitewash]. 
 233   See Morales, supra note 211, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 234   Id. 
 235   See Operation Whitewash, supra note 232, at 6. 
 236   Morales, supra note 211, at 29. 
 237   Id. 
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Helm, Kimo Mitchell, and Billy Mitchell headed out in a boat to Kaho‘olawe. 238 When a 
Coast Guard helicopter appeared to be approaching their boat, someone said, “Hit it,” and the three 
men jumped into the frigid waters on two surfboards and an inner tube and made their way to the 
island.239 The trio searched for Ritte and Sawyer, but were unsuccessful.240 Ritte and Sawyer had left 
their base camp in search of food and water, and a Coast Guard helicopter had picked them up.241 
After they searched the island without success and after their pickup boat failed to arrive, Helm, 
Kimo, and Billy headed into the ocean to make a break for Molokini, an island off the coast of 
Maui.242 Billy turned back and made his way back to Kaho‘olawe.243 Billy saw Helm and Kimo 
struggling in the surf near Molokini.244 No one ever saw George Helm and Kimo Mitchell again.245 
Their deaths increased the efforts of the PKO and fueled a sense of urgency in the community to 
stop the bombing. 
On September 15, 1977, federal Judge Richard Wong ruled that the federal government 
failed to properly conduct the environmental impact statement and violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act and an executive order that mandated the preservation of historic sites. 246 
Judge Wong ordered the federal government to halt the bombing.247 The ruling was a legal victory for 
the Hawaiian people that ultimately led to a 1980 consent decree limiting naval training on the island, 
mandating ordnance cleanup on one-third of the island, and allowing PKO access to the island.248 
The momentum, fervor, and media attention created by the acts of The Hawaiians, 
ALOHA, and the PKO, among others, against the State of Hawai‘i and the federal government 
catalyzed a fundamental shift in the Native Hawaiian journey for justice. These grassroot 
organizations infused their advocacy with a reframing of the present-day struggles of Hawaiians as 
symptoms of historic injustice. In the process, they created the conditions for mass mobilization and 
collective action “aimed at policymakers, bureaucrats, and the American conscience.”249 The right 
climate had been set for those in power to know that Native Hawaiians were yearning for resolution 
 
 238   Id. at 30. 
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 240   Id. at 30-31. 
 241   Id. at 30. 
 242   Id. at 31. 
 243   Id. 
 244   Id.; David Tong, Relatives to Press Target Island Hunt, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 12, 1977, at A-3. 
 245   See Morales, supra note 211, at 31; David Tong, Kahoolawe Searcher is Lost, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 10, 
1977, at A-1. 
 246   Aluli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602, 606-608 (D. Haw. 1977). 
 247   Id. at 606. 
 248   See Jordan Kealaikalani Inafuku, E Kūkulu Ke Ea: Hawai‘i’s Duty to Fund Kaho‘olawe’s Restoration Following the Navy’s 
Incomplete Cleanup, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 22, 38 (2015). Congress eventually passed a law that established the Kahoolawe 
Island Conveyance Commission to recommend the return of the island to the State. Id.; S. 3088, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted). 
In an unprecedented move, the 1994 Department of Defense Appropriations Act transferred Kaho‘olawe to the State and 
appropriated $400 million to clean and restore the island. See Inafuku, supra, at 39. 
 249   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1757 (discussing how social justice advocates redefine historical injustices 
in the collective consciousness). 
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and a seat at the decision-making table. 
B. The Right People with the Right Tools: The 1978 Constitutional Convention 
1978 offered a moment of clarity and a cultural climate ripe for systemic change. Native 
Hawaiians were rediscovering their identity and mobilizing on a scale not seen since their resistance 
to American annexation in the late nineteenth century. One woman’s work with the PKO would 
inspire her to push forth a bold alternative for Hawaiian justice. For as she stood on the shores of 
Maui—gazing through the flames of the fire at the distant island of Kaho‘olawe and watching as her 
comrades prepared for a landing to protest the American military’s bombings—Adelaide “Frenchy” 
DeSoto thought to herself, “there must be a better way to do this.”250 
1. Pūwalu: From Protests to Politics 
Frenchy DeSoto, affectionately called Aunty Frenchy, worked her way from being a janitor 
to the sergeant at arms of the state Senate.251 She had a “husky, cigarette voice, which she used to 
great advantage, gliding seamlessly from perfect English to pidgin to a partial but expressive grasp of 
Hawaiian.”252 DeSoto’s endless commitment to the Ka ̄naka Maoli, her grit, and her tenacity reflected 
her fractured past: 
My full-Hawaiian mother never raised me. . . . [M]y German father killed himself 
when I was 6. The court took us away from our mother. I was raised from foster 
home to foster home, and I ran away from every single one of them. There must 
have been 17 or 16 . . . .[W]hen I speak of starving people, it’s not an intellectual 
exercise. . . . When I speak of the pain of children, it’s not another exercise of 
brain-wave patterns.”253 
It was, for DeSoto, a closely held reality. She volunteered with her children’s schools in her home 
district of Wai‘anae and became involved in community affairs.254 In 1976 on the shores of Makena, 
Maui, DeSoto, a PKO member, pondered the future of the Kānaka Maoli justice struggles: “I 
remember going to the island and listening to the kupuna plead through tears for some righteousness 
to be done to the Hawaiian people, so that we are not on our knees begging to eternity.”255 
 
 250   Curt Sanburn, OHA: The Beginning-Part One, KA WAI OLA O OHA, April 1991, at 12; see ISLAND EDGE OF 
AMERICA, supra note 97, at 309 (discussing DeSoto’s involvement in PKO). 
 251   Michael Tsai, Tough OHA activist “had a heart of gold”, STAR ADVERTISER, (Jan. 23, 2011), https://
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 253   Id. 
 254   Id. 
 255   Sanburn, supra note 250, at 12; see also Edwin Tanji & Bunky Bakutis, A “Family” Against Bombs Seeks Kahoolawe’s 
Return, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 19, 1978, at A-3 (noting DeSoto’s statement that “One thing that Kahoolawe has 
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DeSoto returned from the pilgrimage to Kaho‘olawe and represented the PKO at a 
gathering of Hawaiians in Wai‘anae called the Pūwalu Sessions.256 “Pūwalu” means unity and 
cooperation, and, as its name suggests, hundreds of invitations were sent to individuals who attended 
the meetings to unite the Hawaiian people in a spirit of cooperation.257 Many considered the Pūwalu 
the first post-annexation fora devoted solely to a discussion of Hawaiian issues amongst members of 
the Native Hawaiian community.258 In the first session, the participants, which included 
representatives from twenty-eight different organizations, prioritized five goals: (1) begin the journey 
toward self-determination by establishing political credibility and influence; (2) establish a land base; 
(3) ensure an educational system relevant to the needs and concerns of the Kānaka Maoli; (4) achieve 
economic self-sufficiency; and (5) strengthen “the spirit of ‘ohana and puwalu” amongst the Hawaiian 
people.259 
Pūwalu participants discussed options for seeking justice and reconciliation for the historical 
injustices against the Kānaka Maoli. At the outset of the third Pūwalu Session, Supreme Court of 
Hawai‘i Chief Justice William S. Richardson,260 the first Kānaka Maoli to hold the state’s highest 
judicial post, urged the use of the courts to advocate for justice: “Our courts have recognized that 
Hawaii’s land laws are unique in that they are based, in part, upon ancient Hawaiian tradition, custom 
and usage. This means that in some cases . . . we can look to the practices of our ancestors as 
guidance to establish present day law.”261 Richardson, former Lieutenant Governor under John A. 
Burns, led Hawai‘i’s highest court in issuing watershed decisions that recognized Hawaiian practices 
and understandings,262 defined the shoreline to ensure that the public had access to the ocean and the 
upper reaches of the waves,263 and concluded that the waters in streams were held in trust for all of 
the public.264 
 
Protection of the land has been our culture. Our culture teaches us that the land was given to us to utilize and attain self-
sufficiency. That is, to live off the land, not desecrate it”). 
 256   See ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra note 97, at 308-09. 
 257   See PUKUI & ELBERT, supra note 1, at 360 (defining “pūwalu” as “[a]ll together, in unison, united, cooperative”); see 
also Sanburn, supra note 250, at 12 (noting that individuals invited to the Puwalu Sessions represented 28 different 
organizations). 
 258   Alu Like and the Council of Hawaiian Organizations sponsored the Pūwalu Sessions. See Sanburn, supra note 250, 
at 12. 
 259   Id. 
 260   See generally Williamson Chang, The Life of the Law is Perpetuated in Righteousness: The Jurisprudence of William S. 
Richardson, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 99 (2010) (discussing the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson). 
 261   Sanburn, supra note 250, at 13. 
 262   See Sheehan v. Palama, 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95, 97 (1968) (noting that during the Māhele process whole 
ahupua’a (divisions of land that roughly approximate watersheds) were awarded but the rights of native tenants were expressly 
reserved, “Koe . . . [ke] Kuleana o [na] Kanaka”). 
 263   See In re Application of Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76, 78 (1968) (determining that the shoreline should be 
set in accord with ancient custom that allowed for public use). 
 264   See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330, 1330 (1973) (affirming the state’s property rights 
in the Koula stream and Hanapepe river). Richardson and his successors would later pen various rulings that significantly 
expanded the rights of Hawai‘i’s indigenous peoples. See Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Ka Lama Kū O Ka No‘eau, 33 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 3, 6 (2010) (“Working closely with the other members of the court, [Chief Justice] Richardson helped to reincorporate 
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DeSoto recalled, “Justice Richardson and I had a sad conversation . . . . It hurt him so much 
to see the Hawaiian people coming to court with no resources. We weren’t able to sustain the 
onslaught by those with money who were quiet-titling the land. They were stealing. We had to do 
something.”265 Fortified by her intimate involvement in the Pūwalu Sessions and the struggles against 
the federal government on Kaho‘olawe, DeSoto set herself on a course to change the political tides of 
the Ka ̄naka Maoli. 
DeSoto developed a keen interest in one of the foremost developments from the Pūwalu 
Sessions—a legislative package that included a draft bill to reestablish a governing entity for the 
Kānaka Maoli. In 1977, Hawai‘i State Representative and future Speaker of the House Henry Ha‘alilio 
Peters introduced that Pūwalu bill as House Bill 1469.266 The bill recognized a private, non-profit 
entity called Hō‘a ̄la Kānāwai, meaning “awakening of the law,”267 as the recipient of a portion of the 
Public Lands trust properties—those lands given to the state upon statehood—and funds to be 
expended to benefit Hawaiians.268 Section 5(f) of the law granting statehood to Hawai‘i specifically 
provided that the Public Lands and the income derived therefrom be held as a “public trust” to 
support five different purposes, including “the betterment of the conditions of native 
Hawaiians . . . .”269 Accordingly, its proponents intended Hō‘āla Kānāwai to recognize a private entity 
that, consistent with the mandate of section 5(f) of the Admissions Act, that could accumulate and 
channel eighty percent of proceeds from state lands to programs aimed at benefitting native 
Hawaiians.270 House leadership ultimately referred Hō‘a ̄la Kānāwai to the House Committee on 
 
Native Hawaiian tradition and custom into state law and expanded public rights. His decisions show his successful efforts to 
balance competing factors: the past and the future; Western law and Hawaiian law and tradition; the rights of the individual and 
the rights of the collective; and public and private interests.”). 
 265   Sanburn, supra note 250, at 13. 
 266   H.B. 1469, 9th Leg. (Haw. 1977); Remedial Bill Outlined for Trust Lands, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 7, 
1977, at A-12 [hereinafter Remedial Bill]. 
 267   Id. 
 268   Id.; H.B. 1469. In the act granting the Territory of Hawai‘i’s admission to the United States, Congress set forth 
specific terms by which the new state could enter, one of which narrowly defined the purposes for which the state could use 
the Public Lands. An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union, Pub. L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959). 
Those lands included the Crown and Government Lands of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i illegally taken by the Provisional 
Government in the 1893 overthrow and then improperly “ceded” to the United States in 1898. See Melody Kapilialoha 
MacKenzie, Public Lands Trust, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE, at 79-80 (2015). During Hawai‘i’s territorial period, 
the federal government set aside land from the Ceded Lands for native Hawaiians as part of the Hawaiian Homes Commission 
Act and kept land for military purposes. Id. at 81. The remaining land constitutes the Public Lands trust. Id. 
 269   An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4 
(1959) (“[The Public Lands] shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public j 
institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 
1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible, for the making of 
public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be managed and 
disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, 
and their use for other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States.”). 
 270   See Edwin Tanji, Hawaii Groups Clash Over Use of Agency’s Funds, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 14, 1978, at 
C-23. 
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Water, Land Use, Development and Hawaiian Homes, and then to the Committee on Finance.271 
Hō‘a ̄la Kānāwai died in committee, however, after constitutional scholars raised concerns that the 
state could not create a private and independent agency using public funds.272 Although Hō‘a ̄la 
Kānāwai failed to gain traction in the state legislature in 1977, DeSoto and an ambitious crop of 
delegates resurrected it in the 1978 state constitutional convention. 
2. The People’s Convention: Reclaiming and Reframing Hawai‘i’s Past 
The 1978 constitutional convention was fundamentally different from that which occurred a 
decade earlier when delegates literally laughed at a proposal to protect Native Hawaiians.273 A 
campaign by the League of Women Voters and Common Cause Hawai‘i, supported by the local 
media, framed the 1978 convention as a grassroots convention.274 The media successfully discouraged 
public office holders from running as delegates.275 Compared to the 1968 convention, where one-
third of the delegates were legislators and most of the rest were closely associated with the political 
elite, the 1978 convention aptly represented a body dubbed the “People’s Convention”: only seven of 
the 102 delegates had held political office; there were thirty women compared with seven women ten 
years earlier; and almost half of the delegates were under thirty-four years old.276 
Native Hawaiian attorney John D. Waihe‘e, III won a seat as a delegate.277 Waihe‘e had 
grown up on rural Hawai‘i Island and was influenced by his father, a telephone repairperson who was 
involved in Democratic politics.278 A 1976 graduate of the University of Hawai‘i Law School, 
Waihe‘e’s first two cases were defending Walter Ritte and Charles Warrington, Jr. for trespassing on 
Kaho‘olawe.279 Waihe‘e also participated in the Pūwalu Sessions and was impacted by Pae Galdeira, 
who Waihe‘e heard speak about the struggles of Native Hawaiians.280 
Almost immediately, three groups of delegates formed at the convention: (1) those who 
were in favor of preserving the status quo; (2) those characterized as “independent” for pushing a 
liberal political agenda, which included initiative, referendum, and recall; and (3) a small group aligned 
with Waihe‘e.281 Waihe‘e’s faction had an agenda of changes to environmental laws and Hawaiian 
 
 271   Journal of the House of Representatives of the 9th Legislature, State of Hawai‘i, Regular Session of 1977, at 321 
(1977). 
 272   See H.B. 1469. 
 273   See 1968 DEBATES, supra note 109, at 518 (“Mr. Chairman, this is a matter which I feel is of utmost importance and 
it is not a laughing matter as many of the other people have criticized me for bringing it up.”). 
 274   Interview with John D. Waihe‘e, III, Former Governor, State of Hawai‘i, in Honolulu, Hawai‘i (April 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Waihe’e Interview]. 
 275   STATE OF HAWAI‘I, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII 1978, VOLUME I, at vii 
(1980) [hereinafter 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I]. 
 276   See id. 
 277   Waihe‘e Interview, supra note 274. 
 278   Id. 
 279   Id. 
 280   Id. Waihe‘e later became the first Native Hawaiian Governor of the State of Hawai‘i. Id. 
 281   Id. Waihe‘e’s faction opposed initiative, referendum, and recall because of the potential for the majority to dictate 
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rights.282 None of the factions, however, held a majority at the convention.283 
The first order of business was to organize and select leadership—particularly a convention 
president—who would select chairpersons for the various committees. Jeremy Harris, a delegate from 
Kaua‘i and one of the leaders of the independent group,284 called Waihe‘e and informed him that if he 
aligned with the independent faction, the delegates would elect Waihe‘e president.285 In part because 
of the diverse views of the independent faction, Waihe‘e refused Harris’ offer and instead aligned 
himself and his group with the status quo faction.286 Waihe‘e supported status quo delegate William 
Paty as the compromise candidate for convention president.287 Paty was a plantation manager of 
Waialua Sugar Company and a descendant of individuals who supported Queen Lili‘uokalani’s effort 
to regain the throne.288 Paty described the convention as, 
taking a hundred and two people, most of them with no real legislative 
background, except the very few that were elected, and say, Hey, we want you to 
look at the State Constitution, get yourself organized, develop the rules, develop 
committees, get the hearings going, and come up with recommendations all in 
terms of sixty actual working days.289 
Paty asked Waihe‘e, the power broker, what he wanted.290 The young attorney responded 
that he did not want anything for himself but wanted to be at the table when Paty doled out 
committee chairpersonships to the delegates.291 With his seat at the table, Waihe‘e shaped the tenor of 
the convention. Paty granted Waihe‘e’s request for a new Hawaiian Affairs Committee, for which he 
singled out delegate Frenchy DeSoto to be selected as the chair.292 The creation of this new 
committee and the entrustment of its success to DeSoto represented a turning point for discussions 
of justice for Native Hawaiians. Waihe‘e successfully navigated the early stages of the framing of the 
constitutional debate simply by being at the decision-making and leadership table.293 
 
the course of the political and legal system to the disadvantage of the poor and disenfranchised. Id. 
 282   Id. 
 283   Id. 
 284   Id. Harris would eventually become Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu. Id. 
 285   See ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra note 97, at 308. 
 286   Waihe‘e Interview, supra note 274. 
 287   Id. 
 288   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 10, 502. 
 289   PBS Hawaii Long Story Short with Leslie Wilcox, Transcript of Interview of Bill Paty 5, (July 5, 2011), 
http://www.pbshawaii.org/ourproductions/longstory_transcripts/LSS%20425%20Transcript%20-%20Bill%20Paty.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JY88-VJDR]. 
 290   See ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra note 97, at 308. 
 291   Id. 
 292   Waihe‘e Interview, supra note 274. Per Waihe‘e’s request, his friends and law school classmates Anthony Chang 
and Carol Fukunaga got chairpersonships of the Environment, Agriculture, Conservation and Land Committee and the 
Committee on the Executive, respectively. ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra note 97, at 308. 
 293   See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1765 (“Indeed, struggles over memory are often struggles between 
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In a nod to reframing the scope of the the Hawaiian Affairs Committee’s work,294 
committee members considered proposals related to: (1) the protection and perpetuation of ancient 
Hawaiian rights, traditions, heritage, and archaeological sites; (2) the implementation of native 
Hawaiian culture and language; (3) the preservation of native Hawaiian vegetation and crops; (4) the 
recognition of problem areas common to native Hawaiians; and (5) the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act.295 A dedicated staff provided support for the Committee’s bold agenda.296 In 
addition, DeSoto and Waihe‘e had a “deal”: Waihe‘e would find the votes for and pass out of the 
convention any item that DeSoto could get out of committee.297 
While delegates put forth several proposals dealing with Hawaiian Affairs, three proposals 
formed the basis for the eventual establishment of an agency that would serve as a vehicle for 
reparative action for Kānaka Maoli—a bold idea that had only recently received a lukewarm reception 
from the federal and state governments.298 Delegate Gil Silva introduced Proposal 405 to amend the 
constitution to establish a “commission on Hawaiian affairs” that would coordinate “all government 
affairs directly pertaining to the Hawaiian people, their culture, history and lands,” and “[e]stablish 
facilities to protect and preserve the Hawaiian people, their culture, history and lands.”299 Chair 
DeSoto, in Proposals 674 and 676, proposed revisiting the Hō‘āla Kānāwai concept and provided a 
framework whereby Native Hawaiians would elect a board of Native Hawaiian trustees to “manage 




colliding ideologies, or vastly differing world views.”). 
 294   Although there was a cultural and political renaissance that led up to the Con-Con, Kānaka Maoli affairs were not 
a hot-button issue for the convention. For example, the Legislative Reference Bureau provided a briefing report for Hawaiian 
Affairs Committee members about issues facing Hawaiians, but focused primarily on the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act 
and how nothing much could be done because federal law created it. See ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra note 97, at 308-09. 
The report did not share new ideas of how to advance its declared scope. Id. 
 295   Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978, Committee on Hawaiian Affairs: Scope, (1978) (on file with author, 
retrieved from the Hawai‘i State Archives). 
 296   See Waihe‘e Interview, supra note 274. Waihe‘e considered the composition of DeSoto’s staff “genius” because 
“she hired all the young activists into her group . . . and forced them to get off of . . . talking about stuff and actually writing 
down specific proposals . . . actually working on provisions.” Id. Committee staffers Steve Kuna and Martin Wilson and 
attorneys Sherry Broder and Jon Van Dyke supported the committee’s work. Interview with Sherry Broder, Esq., in Honolulu, 
Hawai‘i (April 13, 2015). Volunteers Walter Ritte (Kaho‘olawe protector), Randy Kalahiki, Francis Kauhane (member of The 
Hawaiians arrested at Parker Ranch and on Kaho‘olawe), Steve Kuna, Mililani Trask, Kali Watson, Alu Like Director Winona 
Rubin, and Georgiana Padeken also contributed significantly to the Committee’s work. See ISLAND EDGE OF AMERICA, supra 
note 97, at 308-09. 
 297   See Waihe‘e Interview, supra note 274. 
 298   See supra Sections III.A.2.b (discussing the ALOHA organization), III.B.1 (discussing Hō‘āla Kānāwai). 
 299   Delegate Proposal No. 405, Constitutional Convention (Haw. 1978) (on file with author, retrieved from the 
Hawai‘i State Archives). 
 300   Delegate Proposal No. 674, Constitutional Convention (Haw. 1978) (on file with author, retrieved from the 
Hawai‘i State Archives); Delegate Proposal No. 676, Constitutional Convention (Haw. 1978) (on file with author, retrieved 
from the Hawai‘i State Archives). 
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A public hearing took place on the evening of August 8, 1978, at the Waimānalo 
Community School Library.301 The hearing, which was originally scheduled to be in Honolulu, was 
instead held in Waimānalo because, according to DeSoto, “that is where native Hawaiians live.”302 
The Hawaiian Affairs Committee sought to consider, among other items, Proposals 405, 674, and 
676.303 Among the numerous individuals who testified were PKO members Ritte, Aluli, and 
Warrington, as well as Department of Hawaiian Home Land protestors Sonny Kaniho, Moanike’ala 
Akaka, and Joe Tassil.304 
Waihe‘e recalled the moment when the idea of creating a Native Hawaiian serving entity 
took form: “Aunty Frenchy called a meeting of the [constitutional convention’s] Hawaiian Affairs 
Committee, so that all these interest groups could come together and thrash it out. Nobody left the 
room. There was prayer, there was yelling, and whatever else you needed to have. At the end, a 
consensus emerged. It was Aunty Frenchy—maybe they were terrified by her, maybe they were 
persuaded by her; I don’t know.”305 The Hawaiian Affairs Committee consolidated and revised 
Proposals 405, 674, and 676 into its own Committee Proposal 13, titled “Relating to Hawaiian 
Affairs.”306 Committee Proposal 13 suggested several substantive revisions,307 including merging ideas 
from DeSoto’s and Silva’s proposals to create a new entity: 
There is hereby established an Office of Hawaiian Affairs. The Office of Hawaiian 
affairs shall hold title to all the real and personal property now or hereafter set 
aside or conveyed to it which shall be held in trust for native Hawaiians. There 
shall be a board of trustees for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs elected by qualified 
voters who are native Hawaiians, in accordance with law. The board members shall 
be native Hawaiians. There shall be not less than 9 members of the board of 
trustees; provided that each of the following Islands have at least one 
representative: Oahu, Kauai, Maui, Molokai and Hawaii. The Board shall select a 
chairman from its members.308 
In its report, the Committee articulated its reparatory goals of providing a “receptacle for any funds, 
land or other resources earmarked for or belonging to native Hawaiians, and to create a body that 
could formulate policy relating to all native Hawaiians and make decisions on the allocation of those 
assets belonging to native Hawaiians.”309 The Committee specifically envisioned that OHA would “be 
 
 301   David Tong, Native Hawaiians Spell Out Concerns for Con Con Panel, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 9, 1978, at 
D-18. 
 302   Id. 
 303   1978 Constitutional Convention of the State of Hawaii, Public Hearing Notice, Committee on Hawaiian Affairs 2 
(Aug. 9, 1978) (on file with author, retrieved from Hawai‘i State Archives). 
 304   Stand. Comm. Rep. Report No. 59 in 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 643. 
 305   Former Gov. Waihee ponders OHA’s 25 Years, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, undated article (on file with author). 
 306   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 812. 
 307   Id.; Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 59 in 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 643. 
 308   Comm. Proposal No. 13, in 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 813. 
 309   Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 59 in 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 644. 
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able to receive and administer any reparations money, which [would] probably be awarded to all 
native Hawaiians regardless of blood quantum.”310 This reframing of historical injustices as requiring 
reparative relief represented a stark shift from efforts in the previous decade.311 
The Committee was “unanimously and strongly of the opinion that people to whom assets belong 
should have control over them,” and added language to ensure that the board of trustees would be elected 
“by all native Hawaiians.”312 The Committee’s decision to limit voting to native Hawaiians was 
necessary to avoid the “criticism which has been directed at the Hawaiian homes commission for, 
among other things, its inability to respond adequately to the needs of native Hawaiians of one-half 
blood.”313 The Committee, therefore, invoked the decades-long struggle to hold the Department of 
Hawaiian Home Lands accountable for failing to house native Hawaiians.314 
Perhaps the most critical line of the Committee’s report was: “The committee intends that 
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs will be independent from the executive branch and all other branches 
of government although it will assume the status of a state agency.”315 The Committee thus indicated 
it was creating a new entity that would operate as an autonomous branch of the government.316 The 
Hawaiian Affairs Committee sought to return power to Kānaka Maoli by providing a form of self-
determination—something the United States stole eight decades earlier. Indeed, the Committee 
envisioned the trustees of OHA to have the power “to contract, to accept gifts, grants and other 
types of financial assistance and agree to the terms thereof, to hold or accept legal title to any real or 
personal property and to qualify under federal statutes for advantageous loans or grants. . . . These 
powers also include the power to accept the transfer of reparations, moneys and land.”317 
 
 310   Id. 
 311   See supra Section III.B.2. 
 312   Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 59 in 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 644-45 (emphases added). 
 313   Id. 
 314   See discussion supra Section III.A.2.a (discussing the efforts of Pae Galdeira and The Hawaiians to challenge the 
inefficiency of the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands). 
 315   Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 59 in 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 644-45 (emphasis added). 
 316   Id. at 645 (“The board shall exercise power in accordance with law, to manage and administer the proceeds from 
the sale or other disposition of the lands, natural resources, minerals, and income derived from whatever sources for native 
Hawaiians, including all income and proceeds from that pro rata portion of the trust referred to in Section 4 for those native 
Hawaiians as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended or may be amended; formulate policy 
relating to affairs of native Hawaiians, and exercise control over real and personal property set aside by state, federal, or private 
sources and transferred to said Board for Native Hawaiians. The board shall have the power to exercise control over the Office 
of Hawaiian Affairs through its executive officer, the administrator of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, who shall be appointed 
by the board.”). 
 317   Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 59 in 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 645 (emphases added). 
Importantly, not all Hawaiians were satisfied with the Committee’s proposal. Mililani Trask, a staff member of the Hawaiian 
Affairs Committee who was recruited by Alu Like, stated: “I opposed the committee’s decision . . . .” Noe Noe Wong-Wilson, 
A Conversation with Mililani Trask, 17(1) THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC 142, 145 (2005) (describing that Trask contended that 
DeSoto’s committee concluded: “(1) Hawaiians were not ready for self-governance; (2) the community initiative [Hō‘āla 
Kānāwai] was a substantial threat, a challenge to the state; and (3) Hawaiians needed a two-step approach ,” creating a state 
agency and then seeking sovereignty). Clearly dissatisfied, Trask left the Committee and the constitutional convention. Id. 
Following her exit from the convention, Trask worked with community members to form the Native Hawaiian Land Trust 
Task Force to focus on self-determination for Native Hawaiians. See Mililani Trask, The Politics of Oppression: The United States in 
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On Saturday, September 2, 1978, the Committee of the Whole debated Committee Proposal 
13.318 Hundreds of Hawaiians, traveling from across the state to lend their support, filled the meeting 
room.319 Aunty Frenchy seized the opportunity to frame a collective memory of injustice that used 
history to push for support from fellow delegates. It was not lost on DeSoto and the Hawaiian 
Affairs Committee that September 2 was the birthday of Queen Lili‘uokalani. DeSoto, at the 
beginning of the session, made a ho‘okupu, offering, in memory of Hawai‘i’s last sovereign.320 The act 
of paying tribute to Lili‘uokalani in a state proceeding was a symbolic gesture that set the tone and 
offered a new way of approaching lawmaking as it was an indigenizing effort to demonstrate the 
importance of Lili‘uokalani to the work the delegates were about to tackle.321 
DeSoto then advocated for Committee Proposal 13.322 She stated that she believed the 
Committee created OHA “to address the modern-day problems of Hawaiians which are rooted in as 
dark and sad a history as will ever mark the annals of time.”323 Armed with an intimate understanding 
of history, DeSoto “critically engage[d] the dynamics of group memory of injustice”324 and began her 
narrative of Hawai‘i’s history not with the arrival of Captain Cook or the bombing of Pearl Harbor.325 
Her reframed narrative instead began “[b]efore the advent of the foreigner” and emphasized how 
Hawaiians developed a “truly remarkable” culture, where land and sea provided sustenance.326 In a 
play to popular media and the cultural terrain, she referenced the recent extraordinary voyage of the 
Hōkūle’a to highlight how “the pre-Captain Cook Hawaiians were great sailors, traveling long 
distances in canoes. They were great navigators, with an almost mystic knowledge of the stars.”327 
DeSoto reclaimed Kānaka Maoli as brilliant farmers, engineers, and healers.328 She described the 
relationship between land, religion, and government: 
The land system before the coming of the foreigner was inseparably a part of 
religion and government. To destroy one was to destroy the other. The Hawaiians 
worshipped nature, which expressed itself in a system of rules—kapus—that 
regulated their daily lives. The islanders were divided into kingdoms, each ruled by 
 
Hawai‘i, in ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY, supra note 190, at 28485. This effort led to the creation of Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i, a native 
sovereignty initiative. Id. at 285–88. 
 318   STATE OF HAWAI‘I, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1978, VOLUME II at 456 (1980) 
[hereinafter 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME II]. 
 319   Waihe‘e Interview, supra note 274. 
 320   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME I, supra note 275, at 252. 
 321   SMITH, supra note 70, at 146 (describing indigenizing as a project of decolonization as centering “a politics of 
indigenous identity and indigenous cultural action” that draws upon the traditions of native peoples). 
 322   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME II, supra note 318, at 456. 
 323   Id. at 457. 
 324   Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1764. 
 325   See discussion supra Part II (describing the starting point for the master narrative as the bombing of Pearl Harbor, 
statehood day, or the arrival of Captain Cook). 
 326   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME II, supra note 318, at 457. 
 327   Id.; see supra Section III.A.1 (discussing the significance of the voyage of Hōkūle’a). 
 328   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME II, supra note 318, at 457. 
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a king. In land matters, as in many others, the king’s words were supreme. Part of 
the land the king reserved for himself for his own private use; the rest he portioned 
out to his subordinates, who in turn portioned it out to their subordinates, all the 
way down to the hoa‘aina, who tilled the soil. 
. . . . 
If you took away his religion, his government, if you took him away from the ‘aina 
or from the economy that he knew, you destroyed him. And many people did do 
this.329 
Hawaiians, prior to Western contact, were not the “savages” and “sinners” that typified the collective 
memory of Native Hawaiians at the time.330 Instead, DeSoto rearticulated Native Hawaiians before 
Western contact as a sophisticated and intelligent people with an intimate connection and 
unparalleled understanding of their land and resources. 
DeSoto then described the significant social and political change and the beginning of the 
injustice that came about with the “influx of foreign invaders,” particularly the rapid transition from a 
“subsistence economy—and with it the whole cultural structure—to an exchange economy . . . .”331 
DeSoto’s labeling Anglo-Americans as “invaders” reframed these foreigners’ role in the violence 
perpetuated against Kānaka Maoli and the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.332 In her plea to her fellow delegates, 
DeSoto noted the decimation that came about with this foreign presence: 
By 1840, native morale had all but been destroyed. The new ways may have been 
superior, but to Hawaiians this was little compensation for the destruction of the 
old and the familiar. Thousands of Hawaiians died. From the missionary estimate 
in 1826 to the official Hawaiian census in 1919, the number of full-blooded 
Hawaiians had decreased from 142,650 to 22,500, while the Hawaiian death rate 
had correspondingly increased until it exceeded considerably the death rate of any 
other race inhabiting the Islands at that time.333 
Native Hawaiians became “hopelessly land-less.”334 This tragic history, recounted by DeSoto, led to 
the “inevitable”: “our mo’i wahine Queen Lili‘uokalani was dethroned—a bloodless revolution but a 
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queen deposed, a legitimate monarchy overthrown.”335 DeSoto placed the overthrow of “our” 
Lili‘uokalani at the forefront of the delegates’ minds. Her mention of the Queen was again buttressed 
by the ho‘okupu that she made on behalf of the delegates to Lili‘uokalani earlier that day, negating the 
master narrative that Lili‘uokalani was lazy, corrupt, and undependable. 
DeSoto concluded her remarks by connecting this history with the opportunity the delegates 
now had to repair the historical wrong it presented: 
Many, many injustices have been documented in our history. All these injustices 
have caused us now to stand in public and bare our souls once more, bare our 
souls so that someone, someplace will begin to listen. Mr. Chairman, fellow 
delegates, if there must be a statement of need before Committee Proposal No. 13 
is accepted or adopted by this Convention, then surely the following statistics 
indicate it: according to the 1975 census updates, the present Hawaiian population 
is a young one: there are roughly 60,000 Hawaiians, or approximately 54 percent of 
the total Hawaiian population, who are under the age of 20. It is my dream and the 
dream of my people that the Hawaiian today be given the opportunity to provide 
for betterment of the condition and well-being of these young Hawaiians, to 
address the contemporary problems which Hawaiians face—of crime, inadequate 
housing conditions, welfare rolls, education. Committee Proposal No. 13, Mr. 
Chairman, I submit, attempts to build the steps for native Hawaiian people so that 
they may realize . . . self-determination.336 
DeSoto’s advocacy framed the measure not as a handout to a racial group but as a means to repair a 
litany of historical injustices perpetrated by the United States.337 She connected this history to 
present-day problems plaguing the Hawaiian people. DeSoto deployed a new collective memory by 
highlighting the damage wrought by settler colonialism and reframed that shared history of injustice 
by telling the story of the Native Hawaiian people.338 
Several delegates echoed DeSoto’s sentiments and expounded on the intent and significance 
of Proposal 13. Delegate Kekoa D. Ka‘apu, for example, explained that the intent of the Proposal 
 
 335   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME II, supra note 318, at 458 (emphasis added). 
 336   Id. 
 337   See also 1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME II, supra note 318, at 460 (Statement of Delegate Barr) (“It seems to be clear 
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was to allow duly elected Hawaiian beneficiaries “to set the framework by which resources can be 
managed and benefits achieved” and to “govern the disposition of these resources and settle on 
policies among themselves. . . .”339 Delegate C. Randall Peterson stated, “I think it’s time that native 
Hawaiians have more impact on their own future, and the transfer to Hawaiians of the responsibilities of self-
government is only right and proper.”340 Like DeSoto, these lawmakers sifted through the relevant and 
irrelevant to conclude that historical injustices occurred and Native Hawaiians were entitled to 
reparative action.341 
Nevertheless, as collective memory is “always hotly contested,” action that responds to 
historical claims of injustice “turn[s] on which memories are acknowledged by decisionmakers.”342 
Here, not everyone agreed with DeSoto. Delegate Akira Sakima questioned whether it was 
unconstitutional for a public agency to be elected by and to benefit only one race.343 For Sakima, 
Committee Proposal 13 conferred racial privileges that tipped an otherwise equal scale in favor of 
Native Hawaiians at the expense of the non-Hawaiian community.344 Sakima failed to see how the 
creation of OHA, as DeSoto articulated, was an effort to repair the negative effects of settler 
colonialism and the racialization of Native Hawaiians.345 Despite these reservations, the Committee of 
the Whole voted to approve Committee Proposal 13.346 DeSoto stated: 
The convention, if it so desires to adopt these proposals set before it on behalf of 
the Hawaiian community, can go down in history as being the only elective body 
truly representative of the people throughout Hawaii, which gave any consideration 
that had meaningful and lasting impact on the native Hawaiian community.347 
In 1978, the constitution-building process provided a fertile site for successfully framing the collective 
memory of injustice. 
The Committee of the Whole, which included all delegates, subsequently issued its report. 
The report indicated that delegates were “impressed by the concept” of OHA.348 They saw the 
creation of OHA as a means to effectuate the betterment of the condition and welfare of Native 
Hawaiians to “unite Hawaiians as a people,” to ensure that “Hawaiians have more impact on their 
 
 339   1978 PROCEEDINGS VOLUME II, supra note 318, at 458. 
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see also Editorial Board, Reparations Setback, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 9, 1978, at A-12 (“It would seem that the best 
approach remains the idea of getting a study commission [on Native Hawaiian reparations] that will both determine the justice 
of the Hawaiian cause and have the respect of Congress to the point it will act on its recommendations.”). 
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 344   See (Re)Righting History, supra note 17, at 640-57 (discussing the Court’s decision in Rice v. Cayetano). 
 345   See discussion infra Section III.D.1. 
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future,” and to provide OHA with “maximum independence.”349 They respected Native Hawaiians 
and accepted as true the struggles they endured. The delegates recognized the harm done to Native 
Hawaiians and therefore sought to help unify them and give them a voice in constructing their own 
future. The Committee of the Whole lauded OHA’s independent nature: “The most important aspect 
of this model is the power to govern itself.”350 The convention delegates thus showed themselves willing to 
turn over some of the state’s power. 
Finally, and in an apparent effort to answer the question of OHA’s constitutionality, the 
Committee of the Whole stated: 
If one looks to the precedent of other native peoples, one finds that they have 
traditionally enjoyed self-determination and self-government. They have power to 
make their own substantive rules in internal matters. Although no longer possessed 
of the full attributes of sovereignty, they remain a separate people with the power 
of regulation over their internal and social problems. . . . In conclusion, these 
provisions are constitutional due to the unique legal status of Hawaiians.351 
The Committee of the Whole, at the advice of legal counsel, and much like the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act, analogized Native Hawaiians to Native Americans.352 The delegates had the 
foresight to affirm OHA’s constitutionality. In so doing, those in power used the constitution-
drafting process to “achieve the specific legal result and to contribute to construction of social 
memory as a political tool.”353 Moreover, by equating the Native Hawaiian situation to that of Native 
Americans, the convention delegates sought to construct a new memory founded upon accepted legal 
precedent. 
During the convention proceedings, Native Hawaiians amplified historical injustices to 
pressure delegates to take bold legal action. Specifically, on September 4, 1978, The Hawaiians—the 
grassroots organization that fought corruption in the state Department of Hawaiian Home Lands—
staged a protest at Hilo International Airport.354 Police arrested sixty-five demonstrators after they 
tried to sit down on the runway to protest inequities against Native Hawaiians.355 The demonstrators 
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denounced the years of rent-free use of the state-owned lands that the airport sat upon because those 
lands were set aside for Hawaiian homesteading.356 They again highlighted this history of broken 
promises and used it as “a catalyst for mass mobilization and collective action” aimed at lawmakers 
and the community conscience.357 
With this mounting political pressure, on September 7, 1978, Committee Proposal 13, as 
amended, came up for its final convention approval.358 Delegate DeSoto expressed her gratitude to 
the Convention for moving forward with this reparative measure: 
We have waited years. Our people have struggled. Our people have broken hearts 
and broken spirits. Many of our opio [youth] strike out and strike back at 
administrative bureaucracies. I want to be able to stand in front of them and tell 
them that indeed the system works and that they should participate in it.359 
With a simple voice vote, DeSoto and her youthful colleagues succeeded. 360 The delegates, 
representing a vote by the people, approved the ideas borne of the Pūwalu Sessions and the cultural 
and political renaissance of the 1970s. 
Committee Proposal 13 joined four other proposed amendments affecting Native Hawaiians 
on the state ballot before the electorate.361 Yet, even with the groundswell in awareness and 
participation,362 the broader public barely approved the five amendments, together referred to as the 
“Hawaiian Affairs Package.”363 To the dismay of many, the package received more “no” votes than 
any other amendment. 364 This was, as one journalist put it, “an unsettling reminder of the reality of 
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being a minority in your own homeland.”365 Nevertheless, the ratification of the Hawaiian Affairs 
Package was victorious. It was now the supreme law of Hawai‘i that the amorphous “Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs” better the conditions of all Hawaiians. 
The framing that supported reparative action for Native Hawaiians changed in 1978—at 
least for a majority of those in Hawai‘i. What was a laughing matter in 1968 was now accepted due in 
significant part to the willingness of lawmakers to recognize a collective memory of injustice that 
acknowledged the struggles of Native Hawaiians.366 In particular, the delegates of the constitutional 
convention framed a collective memory of injustice that emphasized the harms deployed against an 
empowered and thriving Hawaiian nation and people, the often intentional destruction and 
subsequent revival of the Hawaiian identity, the series of continued broken promises and trust 
responsibilities to Native Hawaiians, and the belief that the current socio-economic ills facing Kānaka 
Maoli were a result of this historical trauma. 
The creation of OHA in 1978 demonstrated that the right people—DeSoto, Waihe‘e, the 
Hawaiian Affairs Committee staff, lawyers, community organizers, and other delegates—using the 
right tool—the collective memory of injustice—at the right time—in a constitution-building process 
that occurred during the throes of a cultural and political revolution by and for Kānaka Maoli—could 
produce reparative action.367 
C. Reparative Retrenchment: Memory and Selective Amnesia in the 1979-1980 Legislative Sessions 
The framing of a collective memory is fragile, subject to external forces and shifting cultural 
terrains.368 More importantly, those in power hotly contest collective memory, particularly when the 
narrative threatens an existing power hierarchy or the power of the state.369 At the 1979 and 1980 
legislative sessions, some powerful legislators saw OHA as a threat and, despite the delegates’ 
intention to make OHA independent, decided that OHA should answer to the state legislature. These 
lawmakers held that Native Hawaiians were still not ready for self-determination. 
1. Legislative Backlash in 1979: Using the Melting Pot Narrative to Blunt Reparative Action 
The Legislature had two years to fulfill the constitutional mandate and create the Office 
before a scheduled 1980 election for trustees of the entity. It acted quickly to implement statutes that 
upended the initial purpose of OHA, thereby dampening the victory of the Hawaiian Affairs 
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In early 1979, weeks after the people ratified the constitutional amendments, Representative 
Richard A. Kawakami of Kaua‘i introduced House Bill 890.371 The bill provided the proposed 
statutory parameters for OHA, including the qualification of the administrator, the administrator’s 
salary, and the funding mechanism for ensuring the agency’s success.372 Several individuals submitted 
testimony in support of the proposed bill, including Frenchy DeSoto.373 DeSoto sought to clarify the 
intent of creating OHA: “With an ‘umbrella’ function, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs . . . could 
receive and manage the available resources, implement some programs, contract other entities to 
operate other programs, and be accountable for making maximum use of human and material 
resources to address the needs of Hawaiians with the expected positive spin-offs for all the people of 
Hawaii Nei.”374 Others who testified at that first hearing foreshadowed major issues that would 
continue to haunt OHA throughout its existence, including blood quantum requirements, trustee 
elections, and federal recognition.375 
The House Committees amended House Bill 890 to include provisions consistent with the 
constitutional convention delegates’ intent.376 The amendments equated the salary of OHA’s 
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administrator with other state cabinet-level directors, thereby ensuring a qualified and strong 
administrator for the agency, and they protected the agency’s independence by proposing that OHA 
be tied to the governor’s office “for administrative purposes only.”377 The House also suggested 
allocating $150,000 to fund OHA for the first eight months and $170,000 for the Lieutenant 
Governor’s office to conduct the special election of the first crop of trustees in 1980.378 Convention 
delegate-turned-state House Representative Carol Fukunaga moved that the bill pass out of the 
House and cross over to the Senate for consideration.379 Representative Kīna‘u Boyd Kamali‘i—a 
Native Hawaiian Republican who represented the district encompassing the tourist hub of Waikīkī—
rose in favor of the bill, arguing: “I fully realize this office represents a degree of control and self-
determination for native Hawaiians to create their own future.”380 Representative Kamali’i noted, 
however, her reservation that the bill established election procedures without understanding or 
developing what and how programs will be managed.381 Nevertheless, the House voted on the bill.382 
With forty-nine “ayes” (with two representatives excused), the bill passed Third Reading, and moved 
to the Senate.383 
While the House passed the bill with relative ease, it faced an uphill battle in the Senate. The 
bill needed to pass through three separate committees that each scheduled their own hearings and 
decided on amendments independently.384 The first hurdle in the Senate was the Committee on 
Housing and Hawaiian Homes.385 After hearing testimony, and despite noting the convention 
delegates’ intent to make OHA as autonomous as possible, the committee proposed several 
amendments.386 They felt “very strongly” that the administrator “should not be paid comparable to 
that of a director” because the administrator would “not have the responsibility, duties and 
supervision of personnel to warrant such a salary.”387 With little explanation, the Committee viewed 
OHA as a clearinghouse for all Hawaiian issues, but noted it did not warrant staff and personnel 
commensurate with other state departments holding narrower functions.388 These views made it clear 
that the Senate would not provide OHA with the resources needed to fulfill its mandate of bettering 
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The Senate Judiciary Committee then had its opportunity to determine the legal parameters 
of OHA.389 This committee, led by Senator Dennis O’Connor, explicitly ignored the convention 
delegates’ intent.390 It reframed the collective memory to re-inscribe the master narrative and 
constrain reparative action for Native Hawaiians. In its report, the Judiciary Committee first 
articulated what it believed to be the “legal confines” of OHA.391 The Committee began by quoting 
fom the Hawaiian Constitution, which stated that all persons are deemed under the Constitution to 
be “equal in their inherent and inalienable rights” in “the enjoyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness.”392 The Committee further noted, “inherent in our commitment to those rights is our duty 
to seek with incessant endeavor a society in which race, sex and all other antitheses to merit would 
disappear.”393 The Committee’s invocation of the state constitution’s preamble and the ideal of 
“equality” disclaimed the unequal status of Native Hawaiians and ignored the historical injustices that 
plagued them. The Committee concluded, “[w]e are therefore committed to the ultimate ‘melting 
pot,’ to the interdependence of all peoples, and to social, economic, cultural and educational mobility 
based on merit.”394 
With this one sentence, the Judiciary Committee reframed the collective memory by re-
inscribing parts of the master narrative that sought to racialize and then erase Kānaka Maoli and their 
struggles. The “melting pot” theory Hawai‘i that the Committee highlighted was first articulated in 
Romanzo C. Adams’s 1933 book, The Peoples of Hawaii.395 Adams observed the high interracial 
marriage rate and concluded that Hawai‘i was a “racial melting pot.”396 Noting the “equality” of 
economic, political, and educational opportunity among the “races,” Adams argued that Hawai‘i 
would become a place of one people—a “new Hawaiian race.”397 As deployed by both Adams and 
the Judiciary Committee, the “melting pot” theory provides a legitimizing basis for settler-colonial 
domination by justifying the marginalization and suppression of Native Hawaiians through the 
construct of race and the process of racialization.398 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant, in their groundbreaking book Racial Formation in the 
United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, describe “racial formation” as “a sociohistoric process by 
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which social and political forces continually create, shape and transform race, thereby imparting racial 
meaning to groups, social practices and events. Race is thus changeable rather than fixed, political 
rather than biological and value-laden rather than neutral.”399 The process of racialization, which 
scholar Albert Memmi describes with four discursive strategies,400 involves “characterizing people as 
‘different,’ less-worthy, or less-human ‘others’ (threatening, uncivilized, inferior) to make political 
aggression against the entire group for economic or military reasons appear necessary.”401 Western 
historians, media, government officials, Hawai‘i’s elite oligarchy, and powerful immigrants deployed 
racialization throughout the master narrative to characterize Kānaka Maoli as “others.” For example, 
the master narrative portrays Hawaiians from as far back as Cook’s contact in 1778 as primitive 
savages that were lazy, lewd, and childish.402 The Kingdom government and monarch were “othered” 
as “an absurd anachronism” that was autocratic, corrupt, inefficient, undependable, and “an 
impediment to good government.”403 The racialization of Hawaiians was also pivotal to the push for 
statehood to “reassure a race-anxious continent that ‘the natives’ were not restless but rather docile, 
happy, and whitening through racial amalgamation.”404 The process of othering deployed by the 
master narrative is thereby used to legitimize the seizure of land and state power. By this rationale, 
“lazy” Hawaiians cannot make the land productive, their government is “corrupt” and “inefficient,” 
and “docile” Kānaka Maoli will not challenge American supremacy. The path forged through 
racialization is a map of America’s colonial conquest of the Hawaiian Islands. 
Through its reliance on the “melting pot” theory, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
thoroughly dismissed the reparatory intent of the 1978 convention delegates with brazen disregard. 
The Committee’s report concluded that “unlike legislative committee reports which reflect the will of 
the legislators, the committee reports of the Constitutional Convention do not reflect ‘the will of the 
electorate’ and cannot be given similar weight.”405 Asserting that it was not bound by the delegates’ 
intent, the Committee further declared that, although the convention committee reports suggested 
that OHA should be an independent entity, the language of the relevant constitutional provision did 
not contain language similar to that of Article X, Section 6 of the Hawai‘i Constitution, which granted 
the University of Hawai‘i Board of Regents power to formulate policy “except that the board shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction over the internal organization and management of the university.”406 
 
 399   Serrano, supra note 3, at 365-66; see also id. at 368–69 (“Because the colonizer portrays itself as civilized and law-
abiding, it needs a mechanism for justifying to its people and the world its bald political takeover of another country and its 
people.”); IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW 10 (2006) (“Race can be understood as the historically contingent social 
systems of meaning that attach to elements of morphology and ancestry.”). 
 400   ALBERT MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN: NOTES TOWARD A PORTRAIT 186 (1968) (describing four discursive 
strategies to justify the colonization of non-white races: (1) stressing the real or imaginary differences between the racist and its 
victims; (2) assigning values to those differences to disadvantage the victim; (3) generalizing from these values and claiming that 
they are final; and (4) justifying aggression or privilege). 
 401   See Serrano, supra note 3, at 369. 
 402   See discussion supra Part II. 
 403   President’s Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, H Exec. Doc. No. 47 at vi (2d. Sess. 1893). 
 404   JUDY ROHRER, STAKING CLAIM: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND RACIALIZATION IN HAWAI‘I 83-84 (2016) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 405   S. Rep. No. 10-784 (Haw. 1979) reprinted in 1979 HAWAI‘I SENATE JOURNAL at 1352. 
 406   Id. 
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Absent this language, the Judiciary Committee concluded, the Board of Trustees did not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over its own affairs; instead, the state, specifically the Legislature, retained 
plenary powers over the Board’s activities.407 
Next, the Committee addressed OHA’s organization and trust administration.408 It began by 
amending the proposed requirement that OHA’s administrator be Native Hawaiian,409 attempting to 
justify its rejection of such “racial preference” with a paternalist jab.410 The Committee cited with 
approval the following language from the United States Supreme Court case Board of County 
Commissioners v. Seber: 
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the 
Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an 
uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the 
selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of necessity, the United States 
assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all 
that was required to perform that obligation and to prepare the Indians to take 
their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body politic.411 
For the Senate Judiciary Committee, restricting OHA’s administrator to an individual of 
Hawaiian descent would have eliminated the non-Hawaiian community’s ability to protect Hawaiians 
from the “selfishness of others and their own improvidence.”412 The Committee believed that 
precluding a non-Hawaiian from becoming OHA’s administrator would, in effect, doom the agency 
to failure. Turning OHA’s purpose on its head, the Committee’s amendment ignored the convention 
delegates’ intent to provide a means of self-determination for Native Hawaiians—a necessary 
component of which being the self-control of assets. Moreover, the Committee’s rationale harkened 
to the master narrative’s emphasis on the inability of Native Hawaiians to govern themselves and 
their own affairs.413 With sleight of hand, the legislators failed to acknowledge that the law included a 




 407   Id. at 1352–53. 
 408   Id. at 1356. 
 409   Id. at 1357. 
 410   Id. 
 411   Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943). 
 412   Id.; cf. Judy M. Cornett, Atticus Finch: Christian or Civic Hero? A Response to Professor Mcmillian, 77 TENN. L. REV. 723, 
734 (2010) (discussing the fictional attorney Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird as a “white savior” and noting that “[t]he 
problem with idealizing the white savior is that it simply reinforces white empowerment, the same sort of white empowerment 
that resulted in the oppression which is now being resisted. The white savior motif deprives African-Americans of agency”). 
 413   See discussion supra Part II. 
 414   Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1775. The Committee, however, left open the option for OHA to create job 
opportunities for Hawaiians, but only “to help an isolated Hawaiian community” to “take their place as independent, qualified 
members of the modern body politic.” S. Rep. No. 10-784 (Haw. 1979) reprinted in 1979 HAWAI‘I SENATE JOURNAL at 1357. 
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The Judiciary Committee then amended the bill to allow for suits against the Board of 
Trustees for breach of the public trust.415 Other government agencies received and continue to 
receive shelter against lawsuits through sovereign immunity.416 By denying this same privilege to 
OHA, the Committee rendered the Board vulnerable to a litany of lawsuits brought by any 
beneficiary for any conceivable “breach” of its mandate to better the conditions of Kānaka Maoli. 
Finally, the Committee did not define the “pro rata portion” of the Public Lands revenue. 
Instead, it concluded that OHA’s funds would be channeled through the normal process of legislative 
appropriation, effectively vesting control of the purse strings in the state legislature.417 The 
Committee believed that annual legislative appropriation was necessary to provide “flexibility as 
changing circumstances may well dictate the need to adjust to fluctuating need, merit and availability 
of funds.”418 Following a familiar pattern, this amendment again denied Hawaiians the ability to 
control their assets and determine their priorities.419 The framing of the collective memory of 
Hawaiians being part of a “melting pot” allowed the Senate Judiciary Committee to advance 
regressive amendments to undermine the intent of the constitutional delegates and delegitimize 
OHA’s reparatory integrity. 
Following the amendments in the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate Ways and Means 
Committee agreed that OHA should return to the legislature each year to justify its appropriations.420 
This committee made several minor amendments to the bill,421 which the Senate subsequently 
approved.422 The Legislature’s leadership team eventually formed a Conference Committee to arrive 
at a compromise bill reconciling the differences between the House and the Senate versions.423 After 
negotiations, the Conference Committee report stated: “The hope of this bill lies in the vehicle it 
presents to the long neglected Hawaiian people by way of imaginative affirmative action programs to 
better their condition.”424 
 
 
 415   Id. at 1360. 
 416   U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
 417   S. Rep. No. 10-784 (Haw. 1979) reprinted in 1979 HAWAI‘I SENATE JOURNAL at 1357 at 1358. 
 418   Id. 
 419   Id. In terms of salary of the administrator, the Judiciary Committee concluded that $15,000, which was far less than 
other cabinet-level director’s earnings, was an appropriate amount. Id. The Committee also set the compensation for trustees at 
$50 per day for each day’s actual attendance at meetings. Id. 
 420   Id. at 1439-40. 
 421   S. Rep. No. 10-944 (Haw. 1979) reprinted in 1979 HAWAI‘I SENATE JOURNAL,at 1439–40 (adding the following 
amendments to the bill: clarifying that one member of the board must be from Maui or Lāna’i and that one member must be 
from Kaua’i or Ni’ihau; increasing the annual salary of the administrator to $20,000; and providing that a candidate needed only 
fifteen signatures of registered Hawaiian voters to fulfill the nomination requirement). 
 422   1979 HAWAI‘I SENATE JOURNAL, at 559. 
 423   Id. at 682. 
 424   H.R. Rep. No. 10-76 (Haw. 1979) reprinted in 1979 HAWAI‘I HOUSE JOURNAL, at 1132. Accordingly, the 
Conference Committee added numerous amendments, including: elevating the annual salary of the administrator from $20,000 
to $30,000; mandating the board of trustees to submit an annual budget to the Legislature and subjecting OHA to annual 
government audits; increasing the number of Hawaiians that need to sign nomination papers from fifteen to twenty-five; and 
increasing the funds provided to OHA to $125,000 for the first fiscal year. Id. at 1133-35. 
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Political jockeying and backroom agreements permeated passage of OHA’s implementing 
legislation. For example, the firm House position on the administrator’s salary was that it would 
match that of State cabinet-level directors.425 Senate conferees initially assented, but they undercut 
this agreement in the last minute after claiming a “miscommunication.”426 The Senate insisted that the 
House conferees had agreed to the conference draft, which gave the administrator an annual salary of 
$30,000—below the salary level of a cabinet-level director.427 Representative Milton Holt expressed 
his displeasure with the Senate’s gamesmanship: 
[P]laying politics with something as important as this is very disturbing and really 
bugs the hell out of me. The Senate conferees, I believe, changed their position 
after the conference because of pressure from fellow colleagues who would not 
buy the higher salary level. I sincerely feel that the Senate did not act in good faith 
and purposely claimed miscommunication at the last minute so the House would 
not have time to confer on this matter before the deadline.428 
During the debate following the recommendation to adopt the Conference Committee’s 
draft, several legislators expressed their frustration with the end result. Representative Kamali‘i argued 
that the draft’s reporting requirements turned OHA’s intended autonomy on its head and that placing 
liability with the trustees was counter to general trust functions.429 She professed: “This version of the 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs is an insult, both to the Hawaiians it would pretend to serve and to all of 
the people of Hawai‘i.”430 Kamali‘i specifically called out the master narrative and its racialization of 
Native Hawaiians: 
Since American annexation of the islands in 1898, it has been characteristic of all 
government efforts and eventually programs . . . [to] appeal to the conscience of 
the power-that-be to acknowledge the Hawaiians as weak and helpless.. . . . We 
cannot continue perceiving and judging Hawaiians like beautiful, simple children 
whose only handicap is their own culture.431 
Noting the Conference Committee’s report that envisioned the “ultimate homogeneity” of 
the community, Kamali‘i retorted: “The purpose of [OHA] is not, or should not, be to make or force 
the Hawaiians into being like everybody else, whatever that may be.”432 By invoking a collective 
memory of injustice, Kamali’i sought to lay bare the deep historical realities inflected in what the 
 
 425   1979 HAWAI‘I HOUSE JOURNAL, at 998. 
 426   Id. 
 427   Id. at 998-99. 
 428   Id. at 999. 
 429   Id. at 996. 
 430   Id. 
 431   Id. at 995. 
 432   Id. 
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Conference Committee, specifically through the Senate, had done to the bill.433 
Other legislators, however, perceived a need to resolve the issue immediately and patch the 
gaps later. Citing what he believed was a political attempt to delay reconciliatory efforts for 
Hawaiians, Representative Holt stated: 
[W]hen Hawaiians are given the opportunity to move ahead, people oppose any 
such move because they can’t have each and every one of their concerns addressed 
completely. I would surely hate to see the Hawaiian community come up with 
nothing, which would happen if we vote down this bill. . . . Let’s not be foolish and 
play politics with Hawaiians anymore. This bill before us is a monumental piece of 
legislation which will finally provide the Hawaiians with something to hang their hats 
on.434 
The “something is better than nothing” approach carried the vote in 1979.435 Yet, in the 
end, “not a single member of the legislature who had been a delegate at the Constitutional 
Convention voted for the OHA bill, because it had been sold out.”436 The Legislature “failed” in 
three ways to pass legislation that kept with the spirit of the convention’s reparative goals: first, the 
legislation did not provide an adequate independent mechanism for funding; second, it did not 
provide sufficient resources to support OHA’s mandate of bettering the conditions of all Native 
Hawaiians; and third, the Legislature failed to provide OHA with a strong executive. Nevertheless, on 
June 7, 1979, Governor George Ariyoshi signed the conference draft of House Bill 890 into law as 
Act 196.437 
2. Strong-Arming a Compromise in 1980 
In 1980, the stage was set again for a battle between the House and Senate over collective 
memory. This time, lawmakers fought over the definition of the “pro rata portion” of revenue OHA 
would receive annually from the Public Lands trust. House Bill 1853 set the amount at twenty percent 
of all Public Lands trust revenue. Because there were five purposes of section 5(f), the House found a 
one-fifth (or twenty percent) share for OHA sufficient.438 
The House debated the adequacy of the twenty percent figure, considering the history of the 
Public Lands and Ka ̄naka Maoli. Representative Richard “Ike” Sutton, a Pearl Harbor survivor and 
 
 433   Representative Fukunaga echoed Kamali‘i’s argument, and pointed out that the conference draft failed to 
determine the percentage of funds that would be allocated from the Public Lands to be given to OHA. Id. at 997. Fukunaga 
urged her colleagues to reject the bill and use the interim to further study the issues so that they could draft “more careful 
legislation . . . .” Id. at 998. 
 434   Id. (emphasis added). 
 435   Id. at 1002. 
 436   See Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Former Gov. Waihee ponders OHA’s 25 Years, undated article (on file with author). 
 437   Act Relating to an Office on Hawaiian Affairs, No. 196, 1979 Haw. Sess. L. 398, 408. 
 438   JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 11TH LEGISLATURE, STATE OF HAWAI‘I, REGULAR 
SESSION OF 1980, at 1015 [hereinafter 1980 HAWAI‘I HOUSE JOURNAL]. 
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former federal judge,439 stated: “I feel that making it only [twenty percent] is poor, that it’s a very 
inadequate amount considering that [Native Hawaiians] really, in truth, are the owners thereof, and 
that we should have increased it.”440 House Republican Leader Kamali‘i expressed her displeasure 
with the method of getting to the twenty percent figure.441 She argued for a thirty percent share for 
native Hawaiians, consistent with the congressional approval of thirty percent of sugarcane leases and 
water revenue for the Hawaiian Homestead program.442 Observing the unwillingness of legislators to 
give the Hawaiians any more than the minimum amount required, Kamali‘i remarked: 
I am not here to argue that native Hawaiians should receive a pro rata share of 
[one hundred percent]. I am not politically naïve . . . . The entire state rejoiced in 
the renewed pride and identity of Hawaiians, as long as we were talking about 
music, dance and the arts. When that same pride assumes new dimensions of 
confidence and political expression, I detect fear.443 
Although she supported the bill, Kamali‘i expressed deep misgivings and a feeling of 
collective insult: 
Hawaiians gave freely of their love and trust. All we’re asking is for the same in 
return, and to set the pro rata at [twenty percent] instead of [thirty percent] is to 
ask Hawaiians to accept less than what is legally their right. We are, by this bill, 
only adding another wrong to the too-long list of injustices done against 
Hawaiians.444 
Despite her fervent plea, the bill passed the House unanimously and crossed over to the 
Senate.445 
Staunch in their position from the 1979 legislative session, however, the Senate Ways and 
Means Committee would not budge on its demand that OHA come back to the Legislature every year 
to justify appropriations.446 The Senate remained unmoved despite passionate testimony from 
individuals—including DeSoto, who lambasted the Committee with a recitation of the historical 
injustices faced by Ka ̄naka Maoli.447 At the time, freshman Senator and future Governor Benjamin J. 
Cayetano held the powerful committee’s chair,448 which is often considered the second most powerful 
 
 439   Id.; Craig Gima, Isle Politician and Navy Vet Dies at Age 86, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, July 1, 2001, at A6; Walter 
Wright, Politician “Ike” Sutton Dead at 86, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 2, 2001, at B2. 
 440   1980 HAWAI‘I HOUSE JOURNAL, at 497. 
 441   Id. at 373. 
 442   Id. at 497–98. 
 443   Id. 
 444   Id. 
 445   Id. at 1015–1017. 
 446   BENJAMIN J. CAYETANO, BEN: A MEMOIR, FROM STREET KID TO GOVERNOR 183 (2009). 
 447   Id. at 185. 
 448   Id. 
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position in the Senate after the Senate presidency.449 Cayetano received the prime committee 
leadership position in exchange for his political alliance with Senate President Richard Wong.450 Chair 
Cayetano’s Committee believed that “a dollar amount assignment of proceeds from the public trust is 
more appropriate at this time in light of the yet unclear role and nature of activities of the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs,” and amended the bill to provide a one million dollar appropriation to OHA.451 
Cayetano opposed providing OHA with twenty percent of Public Lands trust revenue and expressed 
his sense of distrust: “My personal view, shared by the majority of my committee and Judiciary 
chairman O’Connor, was that setting the pro rata share at [twenty] percent was like giving OHA a 
blank check. There would be little accountability. OHA, after all, was still a State agency.”452 Cayetano 
believed that OHA needed to justify its appropriations annually, and that the twenty percent figure 
was simply derived from a “logic of convenience.”453 
After listening to DeSoto, whom he characterized as “angry,” an “activist,” and a “political 
demagogue,” Chair Cayetano’s rhetoric betrayed his oblivion to the privileges afforded him by the 
theft of Hawaiian sovereignty and land less than a century earlier: “Frenchy, take a look at the faces of 
the members of this committee. None of our ancestors had anything to do with the historic injustice 
you just talked about.”454 Cayetano’s remarks stand as an apt example of “selective amnesia”—”an 
episodic, often pragmatic, and elective decision of pseudoforgetting.”455 He specifically noted that 
with the exception of Senator Neil Abercrombie, the committee members were all “local” Chinese, 
Filipino, Japanese, or Portuguese, and were therefore not the White settlers that colonized Hawai‘i.456 
Cayetano sought to reframe the discussion as one in which the non-White “local” community had 
nothing to do with the injustices perpetrated against Kānaka Maoli.457 As a rhetorical strategy, his 
 
 449   Id. at 167. 
 450   Id. at 169. 
 451   Journal of Senate of the 11th Legislature, State of Hawai‘i, Regular Session of 1980, at 1479 [hereinafter 1980 
Hawai‘i Senate Journal]. 
 452   See CAYETANO, supra note 446, at 183. 
 453   Id. at 184. 
 454   Id. at 185. 
 455   Cohn, supra note 14, at 601 (citation omitted); see Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1765 (“When outsiders begin 
to persuasively reconstruct historical injustice they usually face fierce opposition by those in power. That opposition seeks 
totally to discredit the developing memory proffered by outsiders.”); MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS, AND 
SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 348 (Daniel L. Schacter, Joseph T. Coye eds., Harvard University Press 1997) (“A way of 
seeing is a way of not seeing. A way of remembering is a way of forgetting, too.”); EDWIN M. YODER, THE HISTORICAL 
PRESENT: USES AND ABUSES OF THE PAST 56 (1997) (“It is well to remember all this rather recent history when we are 
tempted to preen ourselves on the American record of justice, and when we feel an urge to preach on the subject of basic 
human rights to those elsewhere who still sit in darkness. It is among our great American susceptibilities to cherish our myths 
of exceptionalism and special virtue. When the history fails to fit the myth, we bend the history.”); MICHAEL KAMMEN, IN THE 
PAST LANE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN CULTURE 204 (1997) (“[T]he combination of loyalty and stability 
under the oldest written national constitution the world has, indeed, been impressive. But stability is achieved at a price: a 
tendency to depoliticize the civic past by distorting the nation’s memories of it—all in the name of national unity. . . .”). 
 456   See CAYETANO, supra note 446, at 185. 
 457   See MEMMI, supra note 102, at 46-47 (“No matter what happens he justifies everything — the system and the 
officials in it. He obstinately pretends to have seen nothing of the poverty and injustice which are right under his nose; he is 
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statement is what scholar Judy Rohrer calls “individual disassociation,” which allows “an abdication 
of responsibility and a simultaneous suggestion . . . that Hawaiians should ‘get over it,’ ‘move on,’ 
‘stop dwelling in the past’ . . . .”458 Intentionally or not, Cayetano’s individual disassociation ignored 
the role that immigrant communities played in the colonization of Hawai‘i and the dispossession of 
Native Hawaiians from the land.459 
Over many decades, the government and plantation owners imported laborers from China, 
Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Portugal, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to work in sugar and pineapple 
fields that once belonged to Hawaiians.460 Plantation owners and the White oligarchy that supported 
them created racial divisions within the plantations and instituted coercive labor practices.461 They 
racialized each group to justify the discriminatory and stratified sociopolitical structure, in turn 
reproducing a system of economic relations that was harsh, punitive, and, for the planter class, 
lucrative.462 Struggles, deep tensions, and, eventually, a camaraderie developed among these groups 
and formed the basis for “local” identity and politics. These “locals” then “use[d] nostalgic plantation 
narratives and common oppression by the haoles to indigenize themselves” and replace Hawaiians as 
entitled to controlling Hawai‘i.463 These blinders of “individual disassociation” ignore that a great 
number of “locals” have “whitened their social status through Americanization, including economic 
success. . . .”464 By denying “local” agency in the settler colonial story of Hawai‘i, Cayetano justified 
the hierarchy that denies Hawaiians self-determination.465 In this vein, the Senate retreated to its 
position,466 but the legislative battle was far from over. 
 
interested only in creating a position for himself, in obtaining his share. . . . Why should [the immigrants] not congratulate 
themselves for having come to the colony? Should they not be convinced of the excellence of the system which makes them 
what they are? Henceforth they will defend it aggressively; they will end up believing it to be right. In other words, the 
immigrant has been transformed into a colonialist.”); MINOW, supra note 57, at 119 (“The double-edged dangers of too much 
and too little memory lead contemporary figures to make paradoxical calls about remembering the past.”). 
 458   See ROHRER, supra note 404, at 56. 
 459   See Saito, supra note 6, at 25-28 (discussing settler colonialism as “replacing classic colonialism’s hierarchical 
relationship of center to periphery with a triangulated structure in which the colonizers reject the hegemony of the 
metropolitan center or colonial ‘motherland,’ and directly assert control over Indigenous peoples as well as those who are 
neither indigenous to the land nor part of the settler class”). 
 460   See RONALD TAKAKI, PAU HANA: PLANTATION LIFE AND LABOR IN HAWAII 1 (1983). 
 461   Id. at 66-76. 
 462   See Serrano, supra note 3, at 383 (“As Memmi’s framework predicts, race was key in legitimizing the planters’ 
confiscation of land, destruction of Hawaiian culture and self-governance, and exploitation of labor of color from around the 
globe. While the planters ‘used race to legitimize conquest, denigrating, in racial terms, those colonized,’ it also sought to 
civilize those colonial people ‘through the acquisition of [W]estern values and work discipline.’” (citations omitted)). 
 463   See ROHRER, supra note 404, at 63. “Haole” is defined as “any foreigner” but has come to be a universal word to 
refer to a Caucasian person. 
 464   Id. at 62. 
 465   Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1758 (“[Cayetano] filter[ed] and twist[ed], recall[ed] and forgot ‘information’ in 
reframing shameful past acts (thereby lessening responsibility) as well as enhancing victim status (thereby increasing power).”); 
see also Id. at 1764 (“The struggle over recognition of competing collective memories is therefore often a struggle over the 
supremacy of world views, of colliding ideologies.”). 
 466   1980 HAWAI‘I SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 451, at 535. 
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As there were significant differences between the House and Senate versions, another 
Conference Committee was created to negotiate a final compromised version of the bill.467 During 
the conference process, now open to the public, House Majority Leader Henry Ha‘alilio Peters took 
the lead on the bigger ticket items on behalf of the House.468 Peters saw to it that the House version 
of the twenty percent pro rata portion of the Public Lands revenues would prevail.469 But Peters was, 
according to Cayetano, not as “well prepared as he should have been to negotiate the budget and 
related bills.”470 Peters would constantly turn to his staff for assistance when asked questions by 
Senate members about the House’s position.471 Consequently, there were no concessions from the 
senators. About a week prior to the last day of the legislative session, Majority Leader Peters and the 
House changed their strategy.472 Peters withheld House approval of three critical bills—the 
Supplemental Capital Improvement Bill, the Pensioners’ Bonus Bill, and a work-training bill for 
unemployed individuals—until the Senate agreed to the twenty percent revenue provision in House 
Bill 1853.473 With these important bills “held hostage” in abeyance, pressure began to mount from 
Native Hawaiians and retirees demanding that the wrinkles in House Bill 1853 get ironed out.474 
Senators Anson Chong and Neil Abercrombie reported threats of intimidation, and Chair Cayetano 
reported a death threat from a hunter claiming he would “nail” Cayetano as he drove home on the 
freeway.475 Cayetano, as lead Senate negotiator, nevertheless held to the Senate’s position.476 
On the last day of the legislative session, there was no movement on House Bill 1853, and, 
accordingly, no movement on the “hostage” bills either.477 In an unusual move, Governor Ariyoshi 
used his executive authority to grant a one-day extension of the legislative session and, subsequently, 
five more one-day extensions.478 During one of the Conference Committee meetings, Speaker of the 
House James Wakatsuki called various Senate conferees out of the meeting to discuss the bills.479 
“Give them [the Hawaiians] the 20 percent, otherwise they’ll just come back again and again,” 
Speaker Wakatsuki implored Senator O’Connor, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee.480 With the 
pleas from Wakatsuki, mounting pressure from labor unions (who began running ads on the 
Pensioners’ Bonus Bill) and calls from legislators to have their pork barrel projects passed during the 
crucial election year, multiple senators began to rethink their hardline position.481 Cayetano, the last 
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Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,




and critical holdout, finally capitulated to Peters’s demand, and the Conference Committee resolved 
the issue in House Bill 1853 with the pivotal twenty percent revenue language.482 
Given their political strong-arming, the House members ultimately succeeded in getting the 
Senate to bow out and agree to the twenty percent figure.483 The Conference Committee also agreed 
to appropriate $100,000 from general state funds to OHA. Republican Representative Sutton lauded 
Peters as “truly a representative of the Hawaiian people” who had “done the initial research which 
started the Constitutional Convention into their significant thing of having this amendment.”484 
Representative Kamali‘i extolled the significance of the legislation and its reparatory reach: “This 
office is a step towards social justice for Hawaiians, not another welfare or rehabilitation program.”485 
Representative Holt celebrated the work of the two legislative bodies: “Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians 
alike will always remember the Tenth State Legislature as one that did not shirk its responsibility to 
our Hawaiian community.”486 In the end, the Conference Committee draft passed unanimously out of 
the House.487 
On the other side of the State Capitol building, the Senate—with the exception of 
Republican Senator Anderson, who applauded the House’s tactics—took a far less celebratory tone, 
and some senators still opposed the bill.488 Despite the clear intent of the constitutional convention 
delegates to make OHA an independent agency, Senator Ajifu believed that legislators were 
“relinquishing [their] responsibilities” by agreeing to the twenty percent pro rata figure.489 Instead, 
Ajifu expressed a need for state oversight, stating that he believed that the Legislature “should 
appropriate funds for OHA like any other agency and review the appropriations and programs as we 
have done with all other agencies . . . .”490 Thus, the battle over collective memory continued, as the 
threat of relinquishing political power and control was too much for some legislators.491 Senator 
Abercrombie described his concern over the constitutionality of the bill, but he ultimately voted to 
accept the House’s position because the bill was the only vehicle “that we have that can fund this 
office and maintain the agreements that were arrived at in the course of the negotiations over not 
only the budget, but the various and sundry bills associated with the ultimate passage of legislation 
this session.”492 Invoking the image of a defeated Greek army, Senator Abercrombie called the 
passage of OHA’s funding mechanism a “Pyrrhic victory . . . a skirmish in a very large battle.”493 
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 487   Id. 
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 492   Id. 
 493   CAYETANO, supra note 446, at 188. 
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Abercrombie prophetically cautioned: “I regret to say that I expect that the moment this passes into 
statute, there will be a suit and that the business of OHA is, as a result, going to be tied up in court 
for God-knows how many years.”494 
Over the objections, and despite the political brinksmanship and contentions displayed 
throughout the process, the State Legislature finalized the parameters for OHA before its election, 
and on June 16, 1980, Governor Ariyoshi signed the strong-armed compromise bill into law as Act 
273.495 OHA finally had the statutory framework within which the elected trustees would navigate.496 
The House’s strong-arming tactics showed that sympathetic advocates can force substantial changes 
where there is political will. 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of OHA has been described as the “political apex”497 for the Hawaiian 
Renaissance and the “centerpiece of Hawaiian politics.”498 Since its establishment, the State of 
Hawai‘i and the federal government have stymied OHA and other efforts to reconcile historical 
injustices with Native Hawaiians.499 So, what insights can be gleaned from these battles over collective 
memory that are relevant today? How can this story of Hawai‘i in 1978 guide the future as Native 
Hawaiians continue to seek reparative action for the injustices of the past? 
This case study buttresses the well-established theory that all memories and histories are 
subject to manipulation. It adds support to the developing scholarship on legislators’ strategic use of 
memory and highlights that constitution-building and lawmaking are apt sites for the framing of 
collective memory.500 More specifically, OHA’s history demonstrates how the constant negotiation of 
 
 494   Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State, Civ. No. 94-0205-01, at 401 (Haw. 2001) (citations omitted). Lawsuits did 
indeed ensue. See, e.g., Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State, 95 Haw. 388, 388 (Haw. 2001); Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State, 
31 P.3d 901, 905 (Haw. 2001); Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Hawai‘i, 219 P.3d 1111, 1111 (Haw. 
2009). OHA and the state finally resolved disagreements of the twenty percent revenue in 2012—nearly thirty-five years after 
the creation of OHA. 
 495   Act 273, 1980 Haw. Sess. L. 525, 525. 
 496   This statutory framework has been and still can be changed by the Legislature. A Legislature sympathetic to the 
Native Hawaiian cause could increase the percentage of ceded lands revenue afforded to OHA. 
 497   Lee Gomes, Hawaiian Renaissance Reaching Political Apex, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 11, 1978, at A2. 
 498   McGregor-Alegado, supra note 148, at 50. Compare OHA is Born, KA WAI OLA O OHA, Summer 1981, at 1 (citing 
John Dominis Holt, the seminal figure that helped to launch the political and cultural renaissance of the 1970s stating, “Many, 
many Hawaiians made OHA a reality. It belongs to all Hawaiians. The creation of OHA is a major victory for the majority of 
Hawaiians. It belongs to all because we are the lo‘i and the kalo in which and upon which OHA grows”) with Mililani Trask, The 
Politics of Oppression: The United States in Hawai‘i, in ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY, supra note 190, at 284 (stating that “The purpose of 
OHA was to achieve assimilation of the native culture and to guarantee state control of native trust lands in perpetuity”). 
 499   Rice, 528 U.S. at 524 (“As the State of Hawaii attempts to address these realities, it must, as always, seek the 
political consensus that begins with a sense of shared purpose. One of the necessary beginning points is this principle: The 
Constitution of the United States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens of Hawaii.”); see also Legacy in Paradise, supra 
note 352, at 283–92 (describing the failure of Congress to pass federal legislation providing federal recognition of Native 
Hawaiians). 
 500   A legislator’s “treatment of the past through remembering and forgetting crucially shapes the present and future 
for individuals and entire societies.” MINOW, supra note 57, at 119. Indeed, because justice claims begin with struggles over 
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history, mobilization, and power has alternatively perpetuated and stymied justice for Native 
Hawaiians. In 1978, the cultural terrain—characterized by cultural revitalization, grassroots 
organizing, and political resistance—fueled support for inscribing a new collective memory—a 
collective memory of injustice. This memory of injustice, which the media amplified, was built upon 
the important presence of key individuals in strategically appropriate positions to make changes. 
Those in power, like Frenchy DeSoto and John Waihe‘e in 1978, equipped with a “cultural 
framework” that understood and valued historical framing, cast light on the shameful past acts of the 
government and resultant suffering. These individuals pushed decisionmakers, whether allies or not, 
to critically engage “the dynamics of group memory of injustice.”501 These essential elements—
leaders deploying a collective memory of injustice during a critical time of activism—animate Native 
Hawaiians’ political struggles in the present day. 
Indeed, following the live-streamed arrests of revered kupuna, elders, protecting the most 
sacred mountain Maunakea from the development of a thirty-meter telescope, thousands took to the 
streets across all the islands demanding justice.502 OHA released a statement following the arrests: 
“The Native Hawaiian community weeps today. . . . To see some of our most respected kupuna, 
advocates and ‘ohana get arrested for voicing the same concerns our community has expressed for 
decades over the state’s mismanagement of Maunakea brings a kaumaha (heaviness) to our hearts that 
is unbearable.”503 
Much like the 1970s cultural revival, Hōkūle‘a accomplished another monumental feat in 
2017 when it completed its journey circumnavigating the world.504 Hawaiian language revitalization 
also received a major boost recently after widespread backlash following a state court’s bench warrant 
for the arrest of an individual who, although present in a courtroom, chose to respond in the 
Hawaiian language.505 The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i further amplified the language revitalization 
movement in 2019 when it required the state’s Department of Education to provide Hawaiian 
language immersion education on every major island.506 
A new generation of composers have written mele, songs, describing their respect and love 
 
“who will tell the dominant story of injustice and how that story will be shaped,” each lawmaker’s “recounting of historical 
events often determines whether, and to what extent, historical injustice occurred and the present-day need for rectification.” 
Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 11, at 563 ( “The power to shape that story would determine whether, and to what extent, 
historical injustice occurred, and, concomitantly, the need for rectification.”). Therefore, a decisionmaker’s choice of what story 
prevails “is determined by a sifting of the relevant from the irrelevant—a process itself affected by the decision maker’s cultural 
framework” that consists of “social perceptions, beliefs, and practices that form the lens through which . . . [he or she] sees and 
evaluates both daily happenings and society as a whole.” Id. at 565. 
 501   Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 3, at 1764. 
 502   Anita Hofschneider, Another ‘Truce’ After a Day of Arrests on Mauna Kea, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT, (July 17, 2019), 
https://www.civilbeat.org/2019/07/arrests-begin-as-tmt-protesters-block-road/ [https://perma.cc/WGH3-BQ9Y]. 
 503   OHA Statement on Today’s Arrest of Kūpuna and Others on Maunakea, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.oha.org/news/oha-statement-on-todays-arrest-of-kupuna-others-on-maunakea/ [https://perma.cc/HP33-
8LG4]. 
 504   Marcel Honoré, Home at Last, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER (June 18, 2017), http://www.hawaii-
newspaper.com/special_sections/hokulea_home_at_last/html5forpc.html [https://perma.cc/HWB8-VUWK]. 
 505   See E Ola Ka ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i, supra note 119, at 6-7. 
 506   Clarabal v. Dep’t of Educ., 446 P.3d 986, 988 (Haw. 2019). 
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for Hawai‘i and its people. The anthem for 2020 is a mele written by Hinaleimoana Wong, entitled Kū 
Ha‘aheo E Ku‘u Hawai‘i.507 The lyrics call for action and unity, a definite change in tone from Hawai‘i 
‘78:508 
 
Kaiko‘o ka moana kā i lana nei Hawai‘I 
Nāueue a hālulu ka honua a Haumea 
Nākulukulu e ka lani ki‘eki‘e kau mai i luna 
Auē ke aloha ‘ole a ka malihini 
 
Kū ha‘aheo e ku‘u Hawai‘i 
Mamaka kaua o ku‘u ‘āina 
‘O ke ehu kakahiaka o nā ‘ōiwi o Hawai‘i nei 
No ku‘u lahui e hā‘awi pau a i ola mau 
 
Auhea wale ‘oukou pū‘ali koa o Keawe 
Me ko Kamalālāwalu la me Kākuhihewa 
‘Alu mai pualu mai me ko Manokalanipō 
Ka‘i mai ana me nā kama a Kahelelani 
 
E nāue imua e nā poki‘i a e inu wai ‘awa‘awa 
E wiwo‘ole a ho‘okūpa‘a ‘a‘ohe hope e ho‘i mai ai 
A na‘i wale nō kākou kaukoe mau i ke ala 
Auē ke aloha ‘ole a ka malihini 
 
E lei mau i lei mau kākou e nā mamo aloha 
I lei wehi ‘a‘ali‘i wehi nani o ku‘u ‘āina 
Hoe a mau hoe a mau no ka pono sivila 
A ho‘iho‘i hou ‘ia mai ke kū‘oko‘a 
The sea of Hawai‘i surges in turmoil 
The earth of Haumea rumbles and shakes 
The highest heavens shudder up above 
Alas! Woeful indeed are the heartless foreigners 
 
Stand tall my Hawai‘i 
Band of warriors of my land 
The new dawn for our people of Hawai‘i is upon us 
For my nation I give my all so that our legacy lives on 
 
Where are you soldiers of Keawe 
Along with those of Maui and O‘ahu 
Unite, join together with those of Kaua‘i 
Marching alongside the descendants of Ni‘ihau 
 
Move forward young ones and drink of the bitter waters 
Be fearless, steadfast for there is no turning back 
Let’s press onward straight on the path of victory 
Alas! Woeful are the heartless foreigners! 
 
Be honored always oh beloved descendants of the land 
Let us wear the honored ‘a‘ali‘i of our beloved land 
Paddle on in our pursuit of civil justice 
Until our dignity and independence is restored 
 
The resistance on Maunakea spawned movements across Hawai‘i to protect the remaining 
vestiges of sacred spaces and creatures. OHA, along with others, organized workshops and rallies in 
response to the arrests.509 Community members in Pae Galdeira’s home of Waimānalo successfully 
halted the development of a sporting complex on sacred lands.510 Although unsuccessful, community 
members on the North Shore of O’ahu showed up in force to demonstrate against the building of 
massive wind turbines that would kill indigenous animals.511 
 
 507   Kū Ha‘aheo E Ku‘u Hawai‘i, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.oha.org/ku-haaheo [https://perma.cc/
9AJB-C4QT] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
 508   Id. 
 509   Kumu Hinaleimoana Wong, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.oha.org/kumuhina [https://perma.cc/
U47P-ANSU] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
 510   Christina Jedra, Construction Resumes at Waimanalo Park Despite Pandemic and Protest, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (April 6, 
2020), https://www.civilbeat.org/2020/04/construction-resumes-at-waimanalo-park-despite-pandemic-and-protest/ [https://
perma.cc/89H6-ZFZQ]. 
 511   Blaze Lovell & Christina Jedra, Wind Farm Protesters Arrested as they Blockade Road for Construction, HONOLULU CIVIL 
BEAT (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.civilbeat.org/2019/10/wind-farm-protesters-arrested-as-they-blockade-access-road-for-
construction-vehicles/ [https://perma.cc/EM29-773N]. 
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Mass media, particularly social media, provided a powerful and necessary tool for live 
coverage of events as they unfolded atop Maunakea, and they supported efforts to educate the 
broader community about Native Hawaiian struggles. A renewed sense of aloha ‘āina, which spawned 
during the resistance to the bombing of Kaho‘olawe, has emerged: “Aloha ʻāina . . . is the natural, 
undeniable bond between man and environment. Every moment we dedicate to aloha ʻāina is a 
moment we dedicate to our keiki. Moments like these are the little pebbles that will form a new 
foundation—he kahua hale hou. It will be a new reality for our keiki, the rebirth of a new lāhui 
consciousness.”512 Much like the events leading up to 1978, Kānaka Maoli spawned a cultural and 
political revival.513 
But, if the 1979 and 1980 legislative sessions taught us anything, it is that advocates for 
Native Hawaiian justice must work closely with allies to forge relationships of trust and 
understanding. The history of OHA highlights the present-day power that remains with Kānaka 
Maoli to codify their story and dictate their future. Native Hawaiians must find key allies and urge 
them to consider framing Hawai‘i’s past to advance reparative action for Native Hawaiians. 
Communities must use these legislative and constitution-building sites to challenge the master 
narrative to create transformative change. It is only when the battle over collective memory is won 
that true reparative action can occur. The state has disappointed Kānaka Maoli time and time again 
with promises of justice. Something about Hawai‘i in 2021 is different though. “O ke au i hala ka 
lamakū o ke ala i ke kupukupu. . . . The past is the beacon that will guide us to the future.” 
 
 512   Musicians Support Maunakea With One Voice, BIG ISLAND NOW (Sept. 5, 2019), https://bigislandnow.com/
2019/09/02/musicians-support-maunakea-with-one-voice/ [https://perma.cc/VF8H-DSCM]. 
 513   Although it already has OHA, the State of Hawai‘i recently proposed a Blue Ribbon Commission to articulate a 
path of reconciliation with Kānaka Maoli for past injustices. See H.R. Con. Res. 35, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2020) 
(requesting the Governor convene a blue ribbon commission to examine and formulate a reconciliation process relating to 
issues of past, present, and future importance to Native Hawaiians, the State, and the United States); S. Con. Res. 37, 30th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2020) (same). These efforts perhaps indicate a willingness of the state to reengage the Native Hawaiian 
community. 
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